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by wenc
1036 days ago
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I’ve found that in many applications, the difference between a frequentist analysis and a Bayesian one is unlikely to make a difference in the decision making (even with UQ). I’m sure there are fields where such statistical rigor is called for (where the quality of the data is so high and accurate that the variation is in the analysis — often the case with machine data). For everything else there’s so much error. Being to quantify uncertainty is great — it’s a signal we need to collect more and better data. But so often we have to move ahead with uncertain data. Interestingly, in business, taking action (even if wrong) produces outcomes that are much better signals to learn from than having statistically rigorous analyses, so many times there’s a bias for action rather than obsession over analysis. But of course in some fields being wrong is costly (like clinical trials) so I can see UQ being more useful and prominent there. |
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Although there may be no data collected from the time something similar happened before in history, experts can reason through the situation to guesstimate the direction and magnitude of the effect in qualitative terms.
Bayesian formulations are very handy in such situations.
>I’ve found that in many applications, the difference between a frequentist analysis and a Bayesian one is unlikely to make a difference in the decision making (even with UQ).
In that case you may find the following interesting
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lindley%27s_paradox
"Lindley's paradox is a counterintuitive situation in statistics in which the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to a hypothesis testing problem give different results for certain choices of the prior distribution."
How likely is Lindley's Paradox likely to show up in practice ? well there is Bayes for that (tongue firmly in cheek).