[thebooktocome]

> To take a simplistic example, even janitors might potentially have access to ITAR controlled materials if engineers threw them out into a bin bound for a shredder/incinerator and janitorial staff are trained and trusted parts of the disposal chain (which they should be!). Anyone might be able to overhear water cooler conversations.

As I mention elsewhere in this thread, if this is really how SpaceX operates then they’re already in (ethical, if not legal) violation of their duty to protect ITAR from dissemination. ITAR documents should never just be sitting in an unsealed bin waiting for disposal. Employees shouldn’t casually be discussing ITAR around the water cooler.

Assuming everyone around you is permitted to handle ITAR is a recipe for disaster.

[stagger87]

You seem to be confusing ITAR compliance with some sort of security classification. Two different things, and SpaceX deals with both of them.

[xoa]

>You seem to be confusing ITAR compliance with some sort of security classification

This is exactly it, that may be the source of their posts? Being covered by ITAR has nothing to do with whether an American could just go mail order it online let alone chat about it. As a regular American civilian with zero government clearance of any kind, I own a bunch of ITAR controlled stuff. As a category it covers a pretty wide array of technology even when it doesn't seem to be in any way particularly sensitive. All of my suppressors for example are subject to export control, or NVG or FLIRs even when it's ancient tech everyone in the world has. Apparently so can things like optics. It wasn't that long ago that the US government tried to insist that mere encryption was a munition subject to controls!