[glenstein]

It sounds like you're talking about two different forms of determinism like they're the same thing. There's a theory of computation determinism, but then there's philosophical determinism as it's understood in the context of discussions in free will. I understand those to be different things. Just like randomness isn't agency, neither is parallelization.

That said, I think I agree with the upshot of your point that artificial conscious systems could process things predictably, and that our own brains appear to be perfectly functional despite whatever elements of uncertainty, (via our own agency or parallelization or whatever else one thinks is the special thing about consciousness).

[otikik]

Oh I don't believe in "free will" or "agency" at all.

I do believe that in this Universe there's some things are impossible to predict - that there's sources of "pure randomness". And since we don't exactly know how our brain works, I think it possible that our brains might incorporate some of those unpredictable phenomena. Or not. But that is it. Once those initial theoretical random values "are set", our behavior is deterministic. Inconceivable intricate, almost certainly impossible to model or simulate, but deterministic.

[glenstein]

But above you said that our form of consciousness is incompatible with determinism?

[FrustratedMonky]

Might need more detail on how those two forms of determinism are different. I think a lot of people do consider them the same. Enough people that spend time pondering them, that I don't think it is an idle misunderstanding.

Computers, with computational determinism, don't have free will.

But many consider Human Brains to be based on physics, and are pretty pre-determined, and also don't have free will.

Basically, humans also don't have free will, and both determinisms reduce to the same thing.

[Kim_Bruning]

> Computers, with computational determinism, don't have free will.

Define (the properties of) free will, if you will.

Depending on your definition, I might be able to come up with code that exhibits those properties to your satisfaction.

A lot of people believe that the choice is between deterministic and stochastic, while there's actually 3 different classes of deterministic behavior (static, periodic, and chaotic), one of which is most interesting indeed .

Basically a lot of interesting systems are chaotic, and have some similar characteristics. They are nominally deterministic as a prerequisite for being chaotic, but that's about as far as it gets. If you can get the exact same initial conditions twice then yes you do get the same exact behavior out of a chaotic system (due to the criterium that the system is deterministic), but in practice: good luck with that.

[FrustratedMonky]

The parent post had said there were two types of determinism and that they were not compatible.

I was just saying, a computer could be made to model a human and appear to have free will. And that would indicate that both types of determinism are the same.

Personally, I agree, a computer can be made to exhibit those properties.

I just take it further, since a human also has those properties, and can 'appear to have free will'. That any outside observer will have to accept that both have free will, or neither does.

There is no extra 'mystical essence' that gives a human agency, we are following our own programming. We need to eat, mate, get triggered, thoughts come un-bidden. Or another way, to your point, there are chaotic or stochastic systems at play, but those are not 'agency'. Somewhere in a human, maybe there is chaos, but that doesn't translate into a 'agency'.

[Kim_Bruning]

Ah! A subtle point.

I'd think that it's a question of definitions at this point. If two systems are both <sufficiently unpredictable>, I would ascribe "free will" and "agency" to both.

Your reasoning seems to be almost exactly the same and equally valid, except all the signs are flipped, so you ascribe those properties to neither.

Either way the two systems are equivalent.

[FrustratedMonky]

Yes.

Sometimes I like to frame it in the negative.

Because it rarely comes up as an option, that humans might not be 'conscious' either.

I don't mean in a solipsist way. More like in the 'controlled hallucination' framing from Anil Seth. We (human brains) respond to inputs, it is more of a Bayesian, math processing. We aren't really even aware of why we do things, we don't control what we think about. So are we really 'conscious'? And how can we say an AI wouldn't reach at least the same level of 'processing'.

[glenstein]

>Might need more detail on how those two forms of determinism are different.

In the theory of computation, you can make a model representations of computers in deterministic or non-deterministic versions. The deterministic version could be described as a flowchart of possible states a computer can be in.

The non-deterministic version allows for the possibility of branching paths and doesn't make assumptions about what state the computer will be in.

One problem you sometimes get into when discussing, say, randomness or quantum weirdness, is that they might lead to confusion about philosophical determinism. There's determined in the sense of Laplacian predictable exchanges of cause and effect. But there's also a determined in the sense of determined by physics as opposed to an independent, libertarian form of free will.

Similarly, with computers, a computer architecture could be understood in some sense as being non-deterministic, but it's not the kind of determinism that's at stake in free will debates.