[ritwikgupta]

I am a Ph.D. student at UC Berkeley in AI and currently serve as an external advisor to the FBI on AI and AI Policy. I've worked very closely with the teams that utilize FISA Part 702 and have seen the types of issues they are actively preventing with the use of the authority.

[livueta]

Frankly, I don't believe you at all because this pattern has happened before: insiders claim that surveillance is responsible for preventing tons of harm, but when those claims are closely examined (even by other aspects of government) a whole lot of nothing is found.

https://www.propublica.org/article/whats-the-evidence-mass-s...

> In 2013, the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies analyzed terrorism cases from 2001 on, and determined that the NSA’s bulk collection of phone records “was not essential to preventing attacks.”

> The NSA has publicly discussed four cases, and just one in which surveillance made a significant difference. That case involved a San Diego taxi driver named Basaaly Moalin, who sent $8,500 to the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab. But even the details of that case are murky. From the Washington Post:

> In 2009, an FBI field intelligence group assessed that Moalin’s support for al-Shabab was not ideological. Rather, according to an FBI document provided to his defense team, Moalin probably sent money to an al-Shabab leader out of “tribal affiliation” and to “promote his own status” with tribal elders.

It's been long enough that if this shit actually worked, there'd be plenty of success stories that could be disclosed without harming confidential interests. They'd be trumpeting them to the heavens to attempt to justify reauthorization. Instead, we get taxi driver man and a whole lot of "just trust us".

I do acknowledge that ProPublica article is dated, but AFAIK no counterexamples have emerged since - which is kind of the whole problem.

[ritwikgupta]

This is survivorship bias. No counterexamples emerge because successful and working capabilities can’t and won’t be shared? Not until declassification of those sources kicks in.

The government should not give up powerful intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures solely because the general public has a want to know. We have elected representatives with clearances for those purposes.

[livueta]

You obviously didn't even try to read the source, because one of the main points is that reviews of classified evidence by people with clearance found nothing even with that access. Furthermore, people like Sen Wyden - one of those elected representatives you mention - assert, on the basis of classified[1] info shared with the Senate Intelligence Committee, the ineffectiveness of these programs[0], along with a - so far unanswered - invitation to share any such classified info behind closed doors, should it exist. The issue of classification is a red herring if even those with appropriate clearances assert a lack of effectiveness.

That aside, relying on "well, it's classified" is an extra lame excuse in a period of broad bipartisan agreement around the problem of rampant overclassification: https://www.npr.org/2023/01/17/1149426416/the-u-s-has-an-ove...

e: deleted unnecessary swipe

[0] https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-udall...

[1] inb4 "but unclassified programs" - he's talking about unclassified programs on the basis of classified info, as is made doubly clear by the request to share further examples with the SIC

[simple-thoughts]

The idea that people who are close to power are “in on the secret” and thus are more correct that people who aren’t doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. It’s a religious idea that extends back to the earliest gnostic cults.

I’m sure it feels good to you to feel close to power, but those feelings are because you feel powerful by association. It does not mean what you are doing is right or just.

[ritwikgupta]

There’s no feeling of power here. I took on this role because the FBI needs people to help them answer these hard questions, and your traditional Silicon Valley crypto bros won’t help.

I was raised in this country post-9/11 and was taught to fear the FBI. I grew up strongly critical of our surveillance state and the overreach of power that was reported upon. The FBI hosting a deeply critical voice inside to help provide insight to their processes seems like a pretty just thing to me.

If you have better ideas, then I invite you to help change the institution. Come “be in on the secret” (a security clearance to guard national intelligence?) and do the right thing.

[simple-thoughts]

Thanks for the invitation to join your club, I appreciate it.

I’m quite familiar with security clearances from close contacts. It’s also inevitable to run into controlled information in the types of work people like me do.

The real secret is that there is no secret worth keeping. Secrets are a way to cover for incompetence - it’s the same mindset as “security by obscurity.” Even the most secret information regarding nuclear weapons has mostly been leaked. The main thing that prevents nuclear proliferation isn’t secrets; it’s international pressure plus tight controls and monitoring of materials.

The only way to fix the FBI is to dissolve the institution- and even that would be an extraordinary challenge because the criminal networks the agency possesses would still operate, just as the networks built by secret police in other countries persisted post dissolution.

[wnoise]

"Just trust me bro" is not a convincing argument. What are those issues, and why is 702 needed, rather than other approaches?

[stjohnswarts]

I don't think your credentials mean much here, we all know the basics of the Constitution. We all can read the news and see how 702 was abused over and over. Time to snuff it out and start with a blank slate. We have a method of getting surgical strike warrants for only those communication that are necessary to spy on. It's time for the dragnet methods to die off. Freedom comes at a cost and that cost is not making the lives of the CIA and other TLAs any easier to spy on us.

[Zigurd]

Who was convicted because FISA 702 was "key?" How was that evidence used?

[ritwikgupta]

FISA 702 is not a criminal authority. It’s used in cases of foreign surveillance, cyber attacks, terrorism, and espionage. “Convictions” and “evidence” are not the right words, “intelligence” is.

[Zigurd]

The FBI is a law enforcement agency. Cyber attacks are crimes. Terrorism is a crime. Spying is a crime. Where are the indictments and convictions that depend on FISA 702?

[dragonwriter]

> The FBI is a law enforcement agency. Cyber attacks are crimes. Terrorism is a crime. Spying is a crime. Where are the indictments and convictions that depend on FISA 702?

The FBI is principally a national security and counterintelligence agency and secondarily a law enforcement agency.

702 is expressly for the counterintelligence and national security function, limited to foreign targets (non-US persons believed to be outside of the US), and if used properly will only incidentally and occasionally result in information related to persons practically able to be subjected to US law enforcement jurisdiction, whether or not they might in theory be committing US crimes.

Lots of indictments or other criminal process tied to 702 surveillance would actually be a sign of something unusual happening (of which “abuse of 702 for purposes at odds with its express terms” would be high on the list.)

[ritwikgupta]

No, this is a misconception. The FBI is not just a law enforcement agency. It is also an intelligence agency.

[Quillbert182]

It shouldn't be.

[dragonwriter]

The reason to have a counterintelligence agency (which is the role the FBI has in the intelligence community) also be a law enforcement agency is somewhat obvious; domestic law enforcement, at least in that domain, is essential to counterintelligence. (I suppose there is an argument that the counterintelligence agency shouldn't be a broad spectrum law enforcement agency, but I actually think the dangers of an isolated, insular, counterintelligence agency and the kind of culture it would naturally breed would be a bigger problem.

[jstarfish]

Careful, that logic cuts both ways-- you're inadvertently arguing that 702 isn't really doing much of anything. So there's no harm in continuing it, right?

It's about Intelligence, not Evidence. Intelligence (like anonymous tips) is what you use to find the Evidence, which is what you reference in the affidavit. Much Intelligence is speculative and/or bullshit and wastes everybody's time. Publishing Intelligence tips off associates of the adversary and betrays what you know and what your capabilities are, and possibly who you learned it from.

[hypothesis]

> you're inadvertently arguing that 702 isn't really doing much of anything. So there's no harm in continuing it, right?

One would assume that a useless programs should be discontinued, simply because it’s not free to continue them.

[bavell]

Do you think they're showing you the full picture?

[ritwikgupta]

Absolutely. I was given full access to all of their SLs, EADs, and staff members. I was able to brief Director Wray on my findings and continue to engage with their leadership on strategies for the betterment of the Bureau’s stance on key issues.