[simplefish]

Heh. First, Commondreams is not necessarily the best source for a citation. Let's turn to Wikipedia, which explains the Citibank/Travelers merger is fairly decent detail[1]. In short, while there was a time limit of five years (the two years is only without Fed approval, which in this case they would have received), that only applied to Travelers, not to Citibank owning the investment bank Salomon Smith Barney. But that's really a minor quibble. Let's step back and think about the overall purpose of those restrictions.

The standard "Glass-Steagall repeal caused the crisis!" meme focuses on the idea that we don't want banks wagering FDIC-insured retail deposits on the financial markets and going bust, taking our savings accounts with them. And maybe we don't - but this did not actually happen. No retail bank went bust due to their investment banking arms getting overextended. Instead we saw retail banks go bust due to their retail banking operations (specifically, mortgages), and we saw investment banks go bust due to their risky bets on markets. Both of those were always legal under Glass-Steagall.

If the standard "Glass-Steagall repeal is evil" meme has any validity at all, it would seem to be in relation to AIG; an insurer who went bust after making risky bets on the financial markets. Surely Glass-Steagall repeal allowed THAT, right? Nope! The one form of intermingling that actually caused problems during the crisis is the one that wasn't banned by Glass-Steagall. It's no wonder that no serious analysts thinks Gramm-Leach-Bliley had any real impact on the crisis.

So yes, as you say, without repeal Citibank would have been forced - eventually - to sell Travelers. And this would have done...precisely nothing, because as it turns out the purchase of Travelers by Citibank was one of the biggest duds of all time. Nobody actually wants to buy insurance at their bank, and giving access to Citibank (who already had a huge pool of retail deposits) access to the huge pool of premiums Travelers had...did, as near as we can tell, nothing whatsoever. And again, other than AIG (who had no retail banking operations), no major insurance company went under during the crisis, nor did any major bank which went under have an insurance arm. So once again, we ask: Did Glass-Steagall actually prevent anything meaningful?

As for MF Global...yes, they've the villain du jour, and very bad people. But they were not a retail bank, and their operations would have been allowed (or, if you prefer, would have been just as illegal) under Glass-Steagall. Again, what purpose do you think the restrictions in Glass-Steagall served? The only answer is "not letting banks gamble with insured deposits on the financial markets", and MF Global did not do that, and so Glass-Steagall repeal did not impact MF Global. (More generally, what MF Global did is illegal, and so any attempt to argue that MF Global proves we need more regulation is inherently flawed.)

As for the comments about brokers... we're talking past each other. However, since you mention it: There's a lot less than meets the eye to the ABACUS deal. At core, GS's wrongdoing was misrepresenting who picked the CDOs. That's illegal and serious, but they weren't on either end of the trade, much less both. They were more like a sporting goods store selling both AP bullets and body armor to both sides of a gang war. They profited on both ends of the deal, but they couldn't care less which side won. Mind you, GS has often managed to find themselves on both ends of a deal. Check out the deal where GS "helped" El Paso Corp sell itself - suspiciously cheaply - to Kinder Morgan, which GS had a big stake in[2]. Dodgy as fuck. And the deal where GS "helped" Burlington Northern sell itself - suspiciously cheaply - to Warren Buffet (a very big investor in GS) wasn't much better... (Mind you, neither had anything to do with Glass-Steagall.)

[1]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glass%E2%80%93Steagall_Act#Fail...

[2]: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/advising-deal-goldman...

[tankenmate]

There is the point that the investment arms of these banks were "bankrolling" the retail arms. They in fact provided the capital to take the mortgages off the retail banks hands (typically for more than they were worth). This had the effect of encouraging the retail arms to lend to even riskier clients; a positive feed back loop. I think there is probably a case that even a "chinese wall" between these two arms may have reduced the investment arms inducement of the retail arm to take on board such huge risks. As you state though legislating against this is difficult, many so called experts didn't see, or refused to see, this coming. If you put up new rules people will find new ways to get around them. Maybe a social responsibility requirement of the board in the Corporations Act might help? Who knows...

[qdog]

I just cited the commondreams article because it was where I read the snippet (linked from Wikipedia) about Travelers and that's what Glass-Steagall would have clearly had an effect on (regardless of whether it mattered in the long run). As I said, the FDIC ruling in 1982 seemed to open the door to commercial banking being able to hold subsidiaries that deal in securities. Perhaps by the time the sections were repealed in 1999, it had little effect, but there were two decades of financial shenanigans leading up to that point.

If the repeals in 1999 had no effect, why did they need to be repealed?

MF Global is just an example of a firm not following rules about trading accounts.

I think the rules in glass-steagall at the least had a chilling effect, which once removed made the banks suddenly see high returns from high risk. The run into CDO's and new derivatives in 2000-2008 timeframe would still have happened, but I highly doubt the list of endangered banks would be quite as high as it is today. I check the list of newly closed banks every Friday at calculatedriskblog.com.

Greenspan's devotion to market efficiencies also made the Fed unwilling or unable to enforce or implement new regulations, or push congress for power to regulate new financial instruments.

I don't do this stuff for a living, so I'm not going to go find all the regulations and ruling over the last 30 years, but I occasionally listen to guests on The Daily Show that seem to know quite a bit about how financial markets work and read here and there, and my conclusion is that de-regulation up to and even beyond Glass-Steagall repeals in 1999 at the very least amplified the recent financial bombs in the US and around the world. I don't think there is a single "Aha!" moment, it has been a growing problem for 30 years. Quite possibly one of the worst items was a regulation...of de-regulation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commodity_Futures_Modernization...

Your points on GS seem to line up with the original point about GS being jerks to their clients..."They profited on both ends of the deal, but they couldn't care less which side won". That's the point of the guy that quit, right? GS is screwing their clients, they don't care if the client wins or loses as long as GS wins.

Maybe I'll be less enthusiastic about the rules of Glass-Steagall, but my overall opinion that banking fraud is more rampant after de-regulation and that if I came into a sum of millions the last place I'd trust with my investments is GS, is not changed.

[simplefish]

My point is fairly narrow: People love to blame Glass-Steagall, and yet consider the roll call of shame during the GFC: Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Countrywide, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Merryl Lynch, AIG, Lehman Brothers, HBOS, Fannie Mae, HBOS, Lloyds TSB. Every one of those is on the list for two reasons:

1) Being very large ("too big to fail").

2) Having done stupid things which would have been legal under the restrictions of Glass-Steagall. The details of what each did differ, but in every case the stupid actions did not cross a line between retail and investment arms, or retail and insurance arms.

I think that, if you review the list, it's screamingly obvious that size matters hugely, and any regulation reasonably expected to stop the "too big to fail" problem should be looked at very favourably. (Note: No such regulation has been passed, or seriously proposed.) And to a lesser degree, there are some good arguments to be made for bringing regulation of the "shadow banking" sector into line with the rest of the industry, extending deposit insurance to money market accounts[1], and possibly for reducing government involvement in the mortgage industry[2].

What's not obvious is why a regulation that banned something none of the entries on that list were doing would have helped. You say that it had a "chilling effect", but I'm sceptical. If it wasn't for Glass-Steagall, AIG wouldn't have decided to bet the farm on house price stability? Can you articulate any mechanism for how this might have occured?

(If only Citigroup or Wachovia had failed, there'd be an argument that Glass-Steagall repeal helped create "too big to fail" companies by allowing large specialized firms to merge into behomoth diversified firms - but of course, none of those diversified firms failed. If anything, there's a better argument for how Glass-Steagall repeal helped reduce the damage from the crisis.)

[1]: These factors were significantly involved in several of the largest bank failures.

[2]: From the point of view of the taxpayer, the most expensive failures all involved mortgages, most of all Fanny Mae. Abolishing the GSEs and walking back the bi-partisan multi-decade obsession with boosting home ownership rates seems sensible to me. Even today, the idea is highly controversial though.