Hacker News new | ask | show | jobs
by KnobbleMcKnees 1046 days ago
That was Donald Rumsfeld!? I always assumed this came from some techie or agile guru given how much it's used as a concept in project planning.
4 comments

As a military officer who was watching CNN live from inside an aircraft carrier (moored) when he said that, being in charge of anti-terrorism on the ship at the time, it was absolutely foundational to my approach to so many things after that. Here's the actual footage: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=REWeBzGuzCc

Rumsfeld was complicated, but there's no doubt he was very effective at leading the Department. I think most people fail to realize how sophisticated the Office of the Secretary of Defense is. Their resources reel the mind, most of all the human capital, many with PhDs, many very savvy political operators with stunning operational experiences. As a small example, as I recall, Google's hallowed SRE system was developed by an engineer who had come up through the ranks of Navy nuclear power. That's but one small component reporting into OSD.

Not a Rumsfeld apologist, by any means. Errol Morris did a good job showing the man for who he is, and it's not pretty (1). But reading HN comments opining about the leadership qualities of a Navy fighter pilot who was both the youngest and oldest SECDEF makes me realize how the Internet lets people indulge in a Dunning-Kruger situation the likes of which humanity has never seen.

https://www.amazon.com/Known-Donald-Rumsfeld/dp/B00JGMJ914

> Google's hallowed SRE system was developed by an engineer who had come up through the ranks of Navy nuclear power

Wait, really? That makes _so much sense._ It also makes me upset that all of my attempts to sway other SRE orgs over to Nuclear Navy practices have been met with doubt.

- ex nuke submariner

Amazing. Just looked it up. This document references the nuclear navy and civil nuclear power multiple times: https://sre.google/sre-book/lessons-learned/
I’ve read much of that book, but apparently not that far. Thanks for linking.
I'll support you there. In any sensible reading of Nuremberg, they all deserve to hang from the neck until dead. But the central moral failure was Bush. Letting Cheney hijack the vp search, and then pairing him up with Rumsfeld was a bad move, and obviously bad at the time. Those two had established themselves as brilliant but paranoid kooks with their Team B fantasies in the 70s, and should never have been allowed free rein.
Indeed, it is very well possible to be both brilliant and an ethically completely unhinged individual.
> [...] the Internet lets people indulge in a Dunning-Kruger situation the likes of which humanity has never seen.

While we are at it, that infamous Dunning-Kruger study showed didn't even claim what people like to pretend it claimed. In addition the more nuanced claim they did make is not supported by the evidence they collected and presented in their paper. (Their statistics are pretty much useless, and as with any social science study, it has a small 'n' and it doesn't replicate.)

But the mythology 'Dunning-Kruger effect' is too good to pass up in Internet discussions, so it survives as a meme.

I didn't know the names of Dunning or Kruger. I was a medical student who surveyed my classmates on their study habits and also asked them which quintile of the class they believed they stood in. My response rate was high enough that it was impossible to believe so few people from the bottom quintile had responded, and the upper 2 and 3 quintiles were impossibly overpopulated. That's how I learned about the effect. I didn't learn about Dunning and Kruger for several years after that, but when I did, oh boy, did the lights come one.

So, the current fashion of denouncing Dunning and Kruger doesn't jive with me. It was too obvious to discount and I had no idea of the concept when I saw it my own data. I think the misunderstanding has to do with the idea that it's about dumb people being dumb. It's about all of us. We all get it wrong. Even the smart ones. Paradoxically, the smart ones just get it wrong in the less desirable direction.

I think that academic fashionistas may be too clever by half here. Unless you have original data to back up a claim, the internet points aren't worth it. Focus on getting things right.

It's from a post WWII psychological theory the 'Johari Window'. Rumsfeld brought the phrase into wider consciousness.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johari_window

That it came from Donald Rumsfeld in the context of what we know now and what he surely knew then is why it's such a good quote. The words basically say nothing but are also true about everything. So it can implicit be a warning that there is probably some bullshit going on or someone has a sense of humor and is also warning people while also avoiding the subject - of course just my opinion. How people actually use it will depend what the audience agrees it to mean.
The common use I'm referring to is similar to the OP, which is using it as a framework for assessing risk. In particular, aligning a team on the "known unknowns" is critical to building the confidence and alignment needed as a group to be able to deal with unquantifiable/inestimable risk.
I just took a look at that wiki article for Rumsfeld's usage of the "There are unknown unknowns" and I had no idea that he barrowed this phrase to frame his arguments and I was only familiar with that context, unfortunately.
And unknown unknowns is a great way to communicate with stakeholders too
Žižek has a followup to that quote:

"What he forgot to add was the crucial fourth term: the "unknown knowns," the things we don't know that we know."

I've found it's really critical during the project planning phase to get to not just where the boundaries of our knowledge are, but also where are the things we're either tacitly assuming or not even aware that we've assumed. An awful lot of postmortems I've been a part of have come down to "It didn't occur to us that could happen."

I really enjoy the concept of unknown knowns, but I don’t agree with your example, which is an unknown unknown.

To me the corporate version of the unknown known is when a a project is certainly doomed, for reasons everyone on the ground knows about, yet nobody wants to say anything and be the messenger that inevitably gets killed, as long as paycheck keeps clearing. An exec ten thousand feet from the ground sets a “vision” which can’t be blown off course by minor details such as reality, until the day it does.

Theranos is a famous example of this but I’ve had less extreme versions happen to me many times throughout my career.

Another example of unknown knowns might be the conflict between companies stated values (Focus on the User) and the unstated values that are often much more important (Make Lots of Money)

Yeah, you’re right. I was reaching for an example, but yours are much better and better capture the idea.
In the case of the Iraq war, the unknown knowns were probably key...
I think unknown knowns are more easy to spot when teaching newcomers how the system works. Their questions will sometimes be about things we hadn't even considerered (at least in some time) to be the case, but when you have to spell everything out it is indeed the case. In terms of teaching unknown knowns are critical to identify and instead make known knowns so that everyone can end up with a mostly equal playing field.

As an example, there are a lot of unknown knowns that you accumulate over the years in certain lower level languages that need to be spelled out more clearly to someone who is coming at it as a later endeavor. It's entirely possible to spend all your time in a completely managed language nowadays and the concept of the stack, heap, etc., will be largely alien to you. These ideas and their limitations need to be spelled out clearly in order for someone to build the same knowledge base and intuition.

Unknown knowns are essentially endless in nature and extremely hard to find unless you have someone who simply doesn't know to basically fall into traps and guide you toward finding your hidden knowledge.

> An awful lot of postmortems I've been a part of have come down to "It didn't occur to us that could happen."

Would that not be an unknown unknown?

Usually there's a tacit assumption of how the system works, how the users are using the system, or something else about the system or the environment that causes that - it's not that the answer wasn't known, it's that it was assumed to be something it wasn't and nobody realized that was an assumption and not a fact.
That's just an unknown unknown masquerading as a known known.