[gameman144]

> These "judges, jurries and prosecutors" are just people who don't want to associate with potentially dangerous people regardless of the legal outcome.

This is true, but also has excused discrimination in the past (e.g. white flight), and can very easily lead to the tarring and feathering of innocent people.

At the individual level, not associating with potentially dangerous people is fine and smart. When large swaths of people avoid the same potentially dangerous people, though, the "potentially" part really does merit a bit more weight.

[altairprime]

The possibility of discrimination exists in all cases where any human entity, whether individual or group, judges another human entity. This is widely accepted in human societies as a necessary risk of being able to judge others as fit or unfit for participation, and Lichess is exercising their right to do so, just as all other human entities may choose to do. Until a pattern of bias is demonstrated, such judgments are neither implicitly discriminatory, nor are they implicitly a slippery slope to discrimination.

[gameman144]

> Until a pattern of bias is demonstrated, such judgments are neither implicitly discriminatory, ...

I mean, by definition they are discriminatory though: you are choosing to discriminate between individuals that you will associate with and those you won't.

This is not inherently bad, but can definitely be unjust toward those on the receiving end even if it's justifiable by the discriminator.

For instance, maybe a neighbor down the street seems a bit creepy, so I tell my kids not to hang around them to stay safe. This is fine. For that person, though, it may be a totally unfair and unwarranted restriction, and they actually are kind and good, and hurt that people won't associate with them.

The point I'm making is that even if everyone is just exercising their rights and being reasonable and safe, the outcome can disproportionately negatively impact the receivers of the (perhaps reasonable) discrimination.

[altairprime]

Exclusion is not necessarily discrimination. Discrimination is a subset of exclusion, not an equivalent of it. People will be hurt by exclusion. Overuse of exclusion is a possible downside. Enforcement of bias through exclusion is a possible downside. Neither of these potentials means that exclusion is always discrimination. In most circumstances, exclusion is simply exclusion.

When exclusion is used in service to a bias and exists explicitly to disadvantage those the bias is against, that becomes discriminatory exclusion. Lichess is exercising their right to exclude here. You could construct a plausible argument that Lichess is discriminating against organizations that refuse to take a stand against sexual predation upon women and minors; I would absolutely agree.

However, “organizations that refuse to take a stand against sexual predation” is not a legally protected category, and so harassment laws do not apply. By the arguments of the top comments on this post, then, Lichess’s actions are lawful and therefore permissible.

If you’re able to identify amother category where their actions are biased against a protected group, that’s a good tangent, I suppose. But non-religious organizations don’t qualify for such protections, and so any actions taken here against these two chess organizations, are not grounds for a finding of discrimination — regardless of whether their exclusion is deemed to be discriminatory or not.