[chernevik]

Individuals can share risk, that's what insurance does.

The transformation of insurance into a savings scheme puts considerable distortion on that model. It becomes impossible to see what payment is for expected treatment, and what is for risk assignment. The model then encourages people to use more ("I've already paid for it") and to pay no attention to cost. And it encourages the attitude that any problem should be paid for. It's hard to exaggerate the impact of these effects on health care's crazy cost structures.

The real problem isn't people who are riskier, it's people who are costlier. Someone with a prior condition isn't a risk, they're a cost. Insisting they should have "access to insurance" is simply insisting on cost redistribution. The circumstances under which that cost redistribution is a good idea socially should be an entirely different question than the efficient structure of health care payments.

These concepts are deliberately obscured by the political rhetoric around "health insurance", precisely to obscure the cost shifting nature of the project and to create a sensibility that the problems is somehow the greed of financiers. (Obscuring the cost drivers is also a goal, it's a very large industry that employs a lot of people, many of whom, at many levels, stand to lose a good deal if the system were ever seriously rationalized.) It's a very effective rhetorical strategy, especially given the abstractions around risk, but it shouldn't be confused with an actual discussion of the economic problem.

[tptacek]

This is a concern that could be addressed by providing guaranteed issue and a mandate for high-deductible health insurance, and then leaving it to the market to resolve the financing of everything below that high deductible.

That system is in fact not too far from what we're trending towards in the US.

[chernevik]

I don't see how you can say that. We're currently headed towards comprehensive insurance whose holders pay very little out of pocket. Consumers will have no incentive to limit consumption or make cost / quality tradeoffs, and none to police providers for cost.

And "guaranteed issue" is never _insurance_, it's cost sharing. Because it takes the known costs of some individuals and spreads them to others. It is a mandated subsidy. Doing it through "insurance" introduces opacity into the system, which obscures from the electorate the costs of the choices they're making, and reduces accountability throughout the entire system.

[tptacek]

Employees at many large companies today already have the option of high-deductible insurance; scaling the new, as-yet-unimplemented guaranteed issue system "back" to require a mandate only for high-deductible insurance (and thus guaranteed issue only for high-deductible insurance) would not be a major change.

You are articulating the "moral hazard" concern with universal health insurance. I am recognizing moral hazard, and saying that it can be addressed in a universal system simply by setting the threshold that the system pays out at a higher number.

[chernevik]

I'm not talking about moral hazard.