[dsr_]

I can explain the theory.

In scenario H (for hard to fire), we expect employers to spend more time evaluating new hires, because if they make a suboptimal choice, they will be stuck with that employee until they can justify to the authority that the employee is not suitable. This makes them averse to hiring quickly, and also averse to paying a premium unless they are extremely certain of the results. We then expect potential employees to spend more time vetting potential employers, because any involuntary job search process is going to be long and expensive.

In scenario E (for easy to fire), we expect employers to spend less time evaluating new hires, and to be more agreeable to paying a premium, because the loss of hiring suboptimally can be swiftly ended. Since employers hire faster, we expect employees to spend less time vetting employers, since getting a new different job should take less time.

In practice, I suspect that current economic situations are much more of a driver than the regulatory regime.

[esafak]

I can't imagine employers spending more time vetting employees in the tech sector than they already do. The gauntlet candidates run through today is overkill. What more can they test?