[runn1ng]

To cite the first Tor research paper: https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-des...

Not secure against end-to-end attacks: Tor does not claim to completely solve end-to-end timing or intersection attacks. Some approaches, such as having users run their own onion routers, may help; see Section 9 for more discussion.

They are repeating it several times in their documentation, too.

It's not really a bug - there is little that can be done here, IMO.

[inchcombec]

The only way to really counter such an attack would be to have a constant stream of traffic going 24/7 that is set at such a level that your normal usage never exceeds it. Then, when you send a real message, the computer throttles back on the garbage communication and injects your real traffic into the stream. The amount of traffic thus remains constant and it would be difficult to do any type of frequency analysis on the traffic.

However, depending on how high the garbage stream must be set to ensure that there is never a spike of real communications higher than that, it could easily be too costly for most people.

[shabble]

I'm not sure it would have to consistently exceed it, as long as it varied in a random fashion, and that your actual use of the network didn't result in an observable increase in instantaneous or average traffic.

So if it saturates your connection for an hour for 6 hours randomly spaced throughout a day, it's not immediately apparent if that's because you're using it, or it's a decoy stream. Varying the amount used (and always adding at least a little extra when in use) would also make it harder to detect.

At least, that's how it seems to me. There may be some sort of cunning statistical attacks depending on the implementation, especially if the attackers have the endpoint under physical surveillance (and notice that your presence always matches traffic increases of some level)

[wiredfool]

I wonder if running a tor node would have helped mask any signal in a whole bunch of noise.