Ok, no "outrage" here @somenits. This is a variation on a "bad bank" scheme that normally is suggested only where jettisoning the toxic liabilities from the main entity will facilitate a government bailout of the resulting "bad bank". That's what makes the scheme work, normally. There isn't a bailout on the way for J+J's bad bank, and the closest suggestion of any value-creation from the manuver comes from disassociating the consumer brand from consumer injuries they allegedly caused. However, that doesn't sound like a compelling case for such a remarkable corporate manuver.
So then, what we are left with is a "bad bank" scheme that is devoid of a compelling legitimate justification, which you yourself do not offer. This naturally raises an inference that J+J hopes to cram down tort claims via the maneuver. Perhaps the cram-down is in administrative overhead associated with litigation. Maybe it's some kind of mismatch in claim acceptance or approval criteria. None of the materials explain, and while I adore Matt's writing the bottom line is it looks like a shell game and that's from someone with no "outrage" whatever involved.
Would you have preferred I refer to a shell game rather than "three card monte." I do confess some ignorance of street hustle lingo. Or, maybe the street people have already switched to simply calling it the "bad bank game?"
So then, what we are left with is a "bad bank" scheme that is devoid of a compelling legitimate justification, which you yourself do not offer. This naturally raises an inference that J+J hopes to cram down tort claims via the maneuver. Perhaps the cram-down is in administrative overhead associated with litigation. Maybe it's some kind of mismatch in claim acceptance or approval criteria. None of the materials explain, and while I adore Matt's writing the bottom line is it looks like a shell game and that's from someone with no "outrage" whatever involved.