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by mike_hearn
1077 days ago
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Probably not 99%, no. It may be worth noting that macOS doesn't have these issues. The password manager doesn't run as the user, and entries in it have ACLs that restrict which apps can read them. In turn that's enforced by the kernel: apps can't ptrace each other and they can't tamper with each other's files. Browsers, meanwhile, encrypt the cookie store using a key stored in the keychain, so you can't read the user's cookies either. All this is true without app sandboxing being activated. Apps that are sandboxed get even more protections. Apple have done the best job of incrementally isolating apps from each other using different levels of sandboxing. Linux and Windows are far behind even with Flatpak. For example, we tell people who use Conveyor (our product for deploying desktop apps [1]) that one of the most secure platforms to do signing on is a Mac laptop, because the signing keys can be protected such that only Conveyor itself can read them. Even if you execute malware, it would trigger a permission prompt if it tried to access the signing keys, and then the process doing the signing is also protected in the same way. To get the same effect on Linux you'd need to set up dedicated UNIX users and the like. Maybe I should write up a blog post on this stuff. Apple tighten things incrementally with each major release and don't make much noise about it, so I've found a lot of people aren't aware of how advanced their security has actually become. [1] https://hydraulic.dev/ |
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Please do. And post it to HN. It could inspire some distro maintainers.