[fdupress]

Etam absolutely allows you to authenticate an unencrypted context. In fact, you must ensure that the nonce, a piece of unencrypted context, is authenticated. Nothing stops you from throwing more stuff in there.

The only thing you can do with an integrated AEAD that you can't do with a constructed one (with standard interface and security) is include authenticated and unencrypted context halfway through an encryption.

[some_furry]

> Etam absolutely allows you to authenticate an unencrypted context.

You can specify an EtM construction that accepts additional authenticated data. However, you can also do it insecurely (as the post I linked above describes) without realizing you did it insecurely. This is why most people prefer to use cryptographer-approved AEAD modes.

> In fact, you must ensure that the nonce, a piece of unencrypted context, is authenticated.

For CBC mode, sure. For CTR mode? Not really.

> Nothing stops you from throwing more stuff in there.

What prevents an attacker from shifting bits from the ciphertext field into the AAD field in the decrypt path and yield the same HMAC tag? Unless you have an answer to this question, vanilla "encrypt then MAC" is not sufficient. You need a better-engineered construction than that.

I'm pretty sure the linked post covered all of this nuance. Please let me know if something wasn't clear, or you feel it was missing.

[fdupress]

> You can specify an EtM construction that accepts additional authenticated data. However, you can also do it insecurely (as the post I linked above describes) without realizing you did it insecurely. This is why most people prefer to use cryptographer-approved AEAD modes.

Sure, I agree with this. But then the advantage of AEAD over a bespoke EtM is not that AEAD allows the authentication of unencrypted context.

>> In fact, you must ensure that the nonce, a piece of unencrypted context, is authenticated.

> For CBC mode, sure. For CTR mode? Not really.

If you don't, you do not get ciphertext integrity: decryption will succeed, but mostly yield gibberish, if the adversary changes the nonce in a decryption query. This may expose a padding oracle, with all the nice attacks those things allow, depending on details of the application.

>> Nothing stops you from throwing more stuff in there.

> What prevents an attacker from shifting bits from the ciphertext field into the AAD field in the decrypt path and yield the same HMAC tag? Unless you have an answer to this question, vanilla "encrypt then MAC" is not sufficient. You need a better-engineered construction than that.

Yes, you need a well-engineered construction.

> Please let me know if something wasn't clear, or you feel it was missing.

And yes, your linked post covers all this, but that is not the point: your summary of the linked post just claims superiority of AEAD (which I took as integrated AEAD modes) over EtM because of a functionality you claim is missing from the latter. But in the same way you need a well-engineered integrated AEAD to get any kind of security, you will need a well-engineered Encrypt-then-MAC-with-AD construction to get a secure construction. And here "well-engineered" means "ensure unambiguous parsing of decryption inputs," we're not talking about high-flying stuff that doesn't have standard solutions.

In short: I accept the point of your linked post, and I agree with it. But I reject the claim that a functionality mismatch is what makes integrated AEAD better than a constructed EtM.

[some_furry]

> This may expose a padding oracle, with all the nice attacks those things allow, depending on details of the application.

Please describe the padding oracle attack against AES-CTR you're envisioning.

> In short: I accept the point of your linked post, and I agree with it. But I reject the claim that a functionality mismatch is what makes integrated AEAD better than a constructed EtM.

Okay, I don't think we disagree then. We're just debating semantics at this point. :)