[camhart]

I understand your argument, and I appreciate it. The same could be said of of the "other side" of this argument though. The "government will spy on you!"--is also emotional weight cynically being used to get people to go along with technical solutions that support CSAM.

I'd argue society would generally agree CSAM is unacceptable and we're allowing it right now. Many are quick to adopt the assumption that this law is an intentional and cleverly designed "attack on our rights to e2ee", as fact. If one can't recognize it's at least a poor attempt to balance the right to privacy with protecting kids, then I struggle to see how they're being honest with themselves.

I'm not arguing this law proposes the correct solution that should be adopted. I'm not arguing the surveillance state isn't licking their chops. I'm simply trying to point out that CSAM is a real problem. People really care about it. And it's factually wrong to claim otherwise.

It's also wrong and harmful to attribute motive based on assumptions. While you haven't done this, many others have. Instead of taking part in a constructive debate by arguing specific points, they try to paint a false motive on the opposition. "it's just so they can spy on you!" is roughly equivalent to "you view CSAM and that's why you don't want to protect our kids". These approaches are not how you reach a good solution that balances both sides of the argument. They're just throwing the oppositions legitimate concerns under the bus.

I'd also add, while e2ee is strong, unless you're verifying and compiling all the code you run on your device yourself, Apple/Google/etc still maintains the technical ability to snoop on you regardless of this law. I assume the bar to snoop on someone would most likely be lowered if laws like this are passed. But it's still technically possible (and likely happens).

[JohnFen]

> I'm simply trying to point out that CSAM is a real problem. People really care about it. And it's factually wrong to claim otherwise.

Very nearly nobody is arguing otherwise, though.

> Apple/Google/etc still maintains the technical ability to snoop on you regardless of this law.

Absolutely. Not only can they, but they do.

[camhart]

> Very nearly nobody is arguing otherwise, though.

How is equating CSAM to (merely) emotional weight not doing that?

[Al0neStar]

CSAM does carry emotional weight. Your entire argument is that since privacy measures are already loose then its okay to make them looser for "the children".

[camhart]

> CSAM does carry emotional weight.

I never argued it doesn't.

> Your entire argument is that since privacy measures are already loose then its okay to make them looser for "the children".

Where did I make this argument? (hint: I didn't)

[Al0neStar]

Privacy is binary you either have it or you dont and to argue that there exists a "balance" is disingenuous.

[JPws_Prntr_Fngr]

The disingenuousness is the point. You're trying to rationalize with authoritarians, who do not argue in good faith.

[camhart]

That isn't reality. You give up privacy all the time in exchange for things. And even with e2ee you don't "have" privacy guaranteed.

[ghnws]

AFAIK the app code can be decompiled to see what it does. The messaging can be monitored as well. I find it hard to believe these apps could sneak in something that breaks the encryption without anyone noticing.

The proposed solution to stopping child porn from being shared on these platforms would at most only do just that: Stop sharing on these specific apps. There are plenty of alternatives including encrypted zips, TOR etc. Breaking e2ee in WhatsApp would not do anything to stop sharing the material.

I don't think it's a leap to question why this is proposed when it could never achieve it's intended goal.

[camhart]

If the update is targeted at a single individual, it's almost guaranteed to go undetected.

Yes you can decompile code. But reverse engineering is time intensive (I've done it). And these code bases are huge. It wouldn't be difficult to obfuscate some element of the code so it's difficult to detect. Especially if it's rarely triggered.

> The proposed solution to stopping child porn from being shared on these platforms would at most only do just that: Stop sharing on these specific apps. There are plenty of alternatives including encrypted zips, TOR etc. Breaking e2ee in WhatsApp would not do anything to stop sharing the material.

There is value in introducing barriers, even when imperfect. You must admit that, otherwise the fact that Google/Apple can ship an OS update whenever they want negates the entire argument in favor of e2ee.

Also, just FYI encrypted zips are easily brute forced.

[ghnws]

You can not even bruteforce an AES-128 encrypted zip, let alone 7z or rar with stronger algorithms. (Given a decent length password obviously)

> There is value in introducing barriers, even when imperfect.

Not when they are completely ineffective and introduce other issues.