[proggy]

One of the shuttle missions that resulted in loss of crew was caused by operating the vehicle outside of the rated temperature envelope (for the SSB O-rings). If that requirement was honored, the failure rate could have been halved.

The other loss of crew was caused by a genuine oversight in the design of the system, in that the orbiter was always susceptible to strikes from insulating foam falling from the external tank.

Unlike Titan, neither one of these failures were due to the inevitable cyclic wear of the primary pressure vessel. They were both devils hiding in the details, neither one the result of reckless hubris.

OceanGate full on admitted that its carbon fiber hull, a major red flag component at the center of its design, was highly experimental and did not know exactly when it would fail. They foolishly thought that strain gauges would detect issues well in advance of failure, while completely ignoring how immediately and catastrophically composite structures are known to fail. They recklessly sold tickets to fund their experimental craft, inviting people aboard who were definitely not made fully aware of just how flawed the design was up front. These were not all members of the Explorers Club — a former head writer for the Simpsons went on a dive, for goodness’ sake.

So to return back to your point, I’d rather take a shuttle after a few dozen flights than get inside a Titan II after a few dozen dives.

[hgsgm]

More specifically, mission control management intentionally chose to launch Challenger after being notified that the launch was rejected by engineering.

Same as Titan -- Management intentionally launched into catastrophe. At least Rush bet his own life on it, not only innocent victims.

I'm not sure about Colombia.

[nocoiner]

With Columbia, Mission Control knew there was a potential issue pretty much as soon as the shuttle reached orbit, but because there was basically nothing* that could be done about it, they essentially were going to not worry the crew too much about it and hope for the best. As I recall, they modified the reentry procedure somewhat to possibly reduce stress on the affected wing. Obviously it did not work.

* There were a handful of high-risk options that in all probability would have resulted in one or more dead astronauts. One plan would have been to send the Columbia crew on a spacewalk to try to fashion whatever kind of shield they could jerry-rig to cover the ceramic tiles - like bags of frozen water. The most glorious plan would have been putting the Columbia crew on a minimal sustenance/activity schedule right away and then rushing the next orbiter scheduled to fly (Atlantis, I think it was) into orbit on a rescue mission. I get chills even thinking about that kind of mission, but the shuttle was obviously a temperamental vehicle, and if NASA had cut the normal months of prep time into a handful of weeks, who knows what could have gone wrong with that launch. I have no doubt you would have had 100 or more volunteers among the past and present astronaut corps to fly it though.