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by ABCLAW
1098 days ago
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There's a common issue in philosophy and epistemology over how we come to know things. We wanted to know what 'knowledge' was, and settled upon the concept of a 'justified true belief' for a fairly long period of time. However, one day, a philosopher found a situation in which a justified true belief was incorrect. This is the Gettier problem. What you describe is something akin to a network of baysian conditionals attached to certain proposition, which upon confrontation with new information update their relative weights. We know with certainty that this process has significant benefits in general (it's certainly better than most systems not internalizing new information), but can and does create false reasoning. In short, it's good but not sufficient to create knowledge. The problem of individuals creating ideological filter bubbles around themselves is very related to the idea that their evidentiary priors become more and more rigid as they note confirmatory evidence over time that justifies their views over time. The issue isn't that they stop intaking new information, but that their priors and the new information are interpreted based upon that belief network. Thankfully, as a super-organism, we have a great solution for that mental ossification. We die. New people who have less evidentiary accumulation can address the issue with new priors and often that's all that's needed for huge breakthroughs. |
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The question is "what is knowledge?", not "do we know that we know p?". And I see no issue with the definition of knowledge as justified, true belief. Now, if I believe p, and you ask me whether I know p, I may say yes. But whether I actually know p will depend on whether my justification is valid (that it really is a justification and a sufficient one) and whether it is true, which has nothing to do with whether anyone knows whether the justification is valid and the belief is true. It's a separate question, and conflating the two questions leads to an infinite regress of skepticism. So the definition of knowledge qua knowledge still stands.
I would also suggest you try to apply your general approach to the very theory you are proposing. I see an opportunity for retorsion arguments.