[paganel]

> 2003 Iraq’s WMD Programs

> Saddam failed to cooperate with UN inspectors because he was continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Apparently this "analysis" was written in 2009, a good 6 years after the start of the Second Iraq War, and still the CIA followed the political manoeuvre of not challenging their leaders' lies about Iraq's WMD.

This is one of the most vulnerable points of any "intelligence" agency, i.e. they're at the whims of those holding actual power in any given State.

[jboy55]

I love the explanation as to what 'really' happened.

>If Iraqi authorities had destroyed their WMD stocks and abandoned their programs, they might refuse to fully acknowledge this to the UN to maintain Iraq’s regional status, deterrence, and internal regime stability.

How about

> If the current US Administration needs to invade Iraq for their domestic political agenda and requires a narrative of existing WMD stockpiles. They will ignore any evidence that counters this, and even create a completely fictional narrative to justify the invasion.

[Vecr]

Sadam tried to be ambiguous about having WMDs so he could used them as a deterrent without the problems with actually deploying them (kind of like Israel does, but less credible). Sadam was violating UN orders in regards to WMDs, but there was no automaticity so the US was not actually supposed to go in. I think it's plausible the UN would have gone in anyway if the US had waited.

[HFguy]

Probably for the best.

Don’t really want your various 3 letter agencies operating apart from elected leaders.