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by jcranmer
1108 days ago
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I distinctly recall that many of those lessons were learned from the Fleet Problems, especially several of the carrier tactics as well as the logistical lessons (US invested heavier in at-sea refueling than any other navy at the time). So I suspect your source is integrating the Fleet Problems as part of the war games going on, and your denigration of them as "LARPing with ships" is unwarranted. (Of course, perhaps the most famous unlearned lesson from the Fleet Problems was the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor... the Navy simulated a surprise carrier attack on Pearl Harbor two or three times, each time it was wildly successful, and still the defenses weren't beefed up before December 7). |
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Some of the lessons learned in the table games about carriers were before the Fleet Problems could have learned the same lessons, due to the carriers not yet being available. Indeed, one of the issues the games were addressing was just what kind of carriers should be built. I expect any solution the NWC games came up with that could be verified in the FPs would have been. Also, the fleet problems would have provided vital inputs to the enhance the rules the NWC games used.
Other unlearned lessons (from NWC): the importance of unrestricted submarine warfare (this had been ruled out in the games because the British were assumed to be neutral, so not targeting their ships strongly constrained what the subs could do), the importance of night battles (the USN failed to train adequately for these and suffered greatly in the Solomons for it), kamikazes (the games assumed the Japanese would have an adequate pilot training pipeline and not have to resort to this), and what would be necessary to get Japan to surrender (politics in Japan was out of scope.)