[vidarh]

Proving that we can't reliably simulate human brains only requires a single example of a signal emanating from anywhere in any brain that can not be traced to a cause via known physics.

Proving that we can reliably simulate human brains requires showing that nowhere in any human brains does such signals ever emanate. We can get close if we one day have the capacity to run a simulated brain for long enough to show it appears to function like a human, but when the counter hypothesises a violation of known physics that may well be intermittent and extremely limited, we can't realistically absolutely prove its absence.

As such, the former is tractable if such signals can occur, the latter is not, and so I think my comparison of it elsewhere to a claim of Russell's proverbial orbiting teapot is reasonable - people will always be able to claim that there is some so far unobserved difference, and given it postulates highly localised violations of known physics and this seems like an absolutely extraordinary claim, the burden must be theirs.

[wilimitis]

If we can infinitely reach things untraceable to known physics then I don't see how it could ever be proven that we could perfectly simulate human brains, but for the sake of the argument: what resolution do we care to simulate the brain at? Technically speaking, a 1990's chatbot simulates the human brain to some non-zero resolution.

My point is that to make the claim "human creativity" can be simulated surely would have the burden.

[vidarh]

The extraordinary claim would be the claim that something that violates known physics is happening in the brain, and that claim is a necessary prerequisite for it to be impossible to replicate the processes of the brain. As such the burden is squarely on anyone suggesting they can't be replicated to show at the very minimum a plausible indication that there's unknown physics going on.

Just one measurement that doesn't fit would be enough to shift the burden. Absent that, any suggestion we can't is no more than a religious belief.