| > In the 90s I used to edit out CSAM related groups, from the downloaded list in Netscape's built in NNTP client. This list gets downloaded from whatever server you configure and is then local to your machine. Editing it would only affect what you see on your own client. > After a time I got unhappy about this and went to see if I could determine a physical hosting location of the content. Usenet is a distributed system - every server that didn't filter the group was hosting the content. They were typically viewed as common carriers. (It sounds like you were tracing your own ISP's server?) On that note some from upstate New York may remember that the attorney general tried to garner votes by raiding and seizing servers from a few local ISPs (Dreamscape, RIP), which in the end didn't work out. > I wasn't willing to reach out to the FBI blindly and couldn't locate anyone who know anyone in the bureau. The FBI was quite well aware of the content on Usenet and very adept at navigating it in its heydey. They used it in a number of investigations to track down producers including breaking into trusted rings that communicated with PGP encrypted communications on Usenet. You wouldn't have informed them of anything they didn't know. |
I know. I mentioned I was editing list on clients' (plural) PCs.
> Usenet is a distributed system - every server that didn't filter the group was hosting the content.
Right. I had found a physical address of hard drives containing the data. That it wasn't the only location of the data might not have mattered to an LEO. It all depended on how many gold stars this type of bust generated (at that time).
Hindsight recognizes here that the odds were against LEO being particularly interested. External political pressure may have changed that.
> It sounds like you were tracing your own ISP's server?
Multiple clients, multiple ISPs. IIRC I determined that AT&T was supplying NNTP to all of them.
> On that note some from upstate New York may remember that the attorney general tried to garner votes by raiding and seizing servers from a few local ISPs (Dreamscape, RIP), which in the end didn't work out.
When one grandstands in the press, one takes one's chances. Quiet LEO actions work a differently shuffled deck.
> The FBI was quite well aware of the content on Usenet and very adept at navigating it in its heydey.
Absolutely. However, the one action they never, ever, ever took was anything at all against the corporate hosts and suppliers of that data. There are many strong possibilities for this, some understandable and some corrupt.