Hacker News new | ask | show | jobs
by tptacek 1115 days ago
This is theoretically true but not really true in practice right now.

If a CA misissues a cert for something major, like Facebook or Google Mail, and Google or Mozilla find out, my current belief is that they'd be in for a world of hurt.

But if a CA misissued such a cert for a single specific target, without a CT SCT, neither Chrome nor Safari will report that (currently, CAs are explicitly allowed to issue non-CT-logged certs; the check on that is that Chrome and Safari won't honor that certificate --- a reason, by the way, to reconsider Firefox). If Google found out that you'd misissued a non-logged Google Mail certificate, you'd get nuked. But there's nothing currently in place to make Google find that out.

It's clear what tweaks to the system would need to occur to make this work that way it would "ideally" work, and the problems are mostly not technical; you'd just have Chrome (or Safari, or Firefox) report certs without SCTs in its default configuration. But that kind of surveillance isn't really a thing right now.

I've been cagey about this in past discussions because my understanding was that the Chrome team did do some of this kind of surveillance informally. And I believe they did --- but I'm told that stopped being a thing years ago. Now they just don't accept certs unless they're logged, and that's that.

1 comments

> If a CA misissues a cert for something major, like Facebook or Google Mail, and Google or Mozilla find out, my current belief is that they'd be in for a world of hurt.

It doesn't even need to be major. Misissuing for example.com and test.com were major factors in the distrust of Symantec and Certinomis, respectively.

> It's clear what tweaks to the system would need to occur to make this work that way it would "ideally" work, and the problems are mostly not technical; you'd just have Chrome (or Safari, or Firefox) report certs without SCTs in its default configuration.

This would require a pretty big paradigm shift which is hard to see happening. But as long as clients require SCTs (Firefox needs to hurry up already) this is not really necessary.

> I've been cagey about this in past discussions because my understanding was that the Chrome team did do some of this kind of surveillance informally. And I believe they did --- but I'm told that stopped being a thing years ago.

I'm pretty sure this has never been the case. I think at one point Chrome may have reported certificates for Google domains that were not issued by a Google CA, but this was unrelated to CT.

Or maybe you're thinking of the Googlebot, which logs the certificates it sees while crawling the web.

I may have misconstrued things I was told by team members, or you might have, but either way it doesn't matter, because it's not happening now. You were right to call this out on the last DNSSEC thread, and I want to make sure I'm not endorsing a WebPKI security feature that doesn't currently exist. :)