| Those economic explanations are searching for keys under the lamp post. As Tanner Greer notes[1]: > Structurally the arguments in both countries go like “life is so hard, and things generally so depressing, that I have no desire to bring children into the world.” > In both cases generations previous, who lived through events far more harrowing and whose material circumstances were far worse, did not express similar beliefs at any scale. Improving living conditions is always nice, so it is shoehorned into every conversation. What arguments could he raised against improving the atrocious housing situation (at least on the level of vague sentiment, "time to build", not necessarily YIMBY activism)? None at all, the very attempt amounts to a political suicide. Yet when you see basically the same trends and very similar absolute values in countries as dramatically distinct as Argentina, Belgium, England, Iran and Russia [2], it becomes increasingly clear that no economic variable suffices, no charitable materialist analysis can account for the cultural shift. The real answer is simply the perceived value of children and lifestyle amenable to their existence plummeting worldwide. Now, even minor (by the standards of our predecessors) inconveniences and contrived long-term considerations like climate change can be cited as legitimate reason to not have any (or not have more than one). Modernity sees no point to children. And as nations age and budget decisions are weighted in favor of older and childless people, as urban infrastructure itself evolves to make children more of a labor-intensive chore a working person would not be expected to afford, any possible remaining point becomes even less compelling. But to begin with, rationalizing the child-free lifestyle with material excuses is just a vestige of old normative morality, token respect for traditional natalism. In fact, we would advance the discourse more if we paid attention to outliers both in terms of fertility and in terms of its trend, those being, to my knowledge: Israel, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. And no, it's not entirely about low-education traditionalist groups, certainly not in Israel. 1. https://twitter.com/Scholars_Stage/status/165885018362973389... 2. https://twitter.com/BirthGauge/status/1662234743851700224 |
Yes it is, Israel’s high fertility rate is driven by tribes that either explicitly or implicitly influence how many children they want by restricting their financial independence. Same story with all the other countries you listed.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Israel
> The ethnic group with highest recorded TFR is the Bedouin of Negev. Their TFR was reported at 10.06 in 1998, and 5.73 in 2009. TFR is also very high among Haredi Jews. For Ashkenazi Haredim, the TFR rose from 6.91 in 1980 to 8.51 in 1996. The figure for 2008 is estimated to be even higher. TFR for Sephardi/Mizrahi Haredim rose from 4.57 in 1980 to 6.57 in 1996.[30] In 2020 the overall Jewish TFR in Israel (3.00) was for the first time measured higher than Arab Muslim TFR (2.99).
Look at the graph here of the fertility rates of different types of Jews:
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/08/18/...