[toast0]

If the US is going to seize cryptographic material from CAs, they've probably got no problem ordering US based domain registries to do their bidding either. If it's Verisign registry, they can use the Verisign CA too, and it's only one company to compel.

If all else fails, ICANN runs the root servers more or less, and is based in the US, and subject to being compelled to make bad signatues of tld glue records.

[AndyMcConachie]

First off, ICANN doesn't run the root servers. ICANN operates 1 root server identity,l-root.root-servers.net. The others are run by different organizations.

Secondly, the root server operators have no control over the cryptography. They get a zone file and they serve it.

ICANN only runs the key generation ceremony which is scripted to prevent any single entity from tampering with the keys. ZSKs are generated a few months in advance and used by Verisign (the root zone maintainer) to sign the root zone. No one gets to see the private part of the KSK. So there is no way to compel ICANN to produce bad signatures.

Finally, glue records aren't signed!

https://www.internic.net/domain/root.zone

[toast0]

> ICANN only runs the key generation ceremony which is scripted to prevent any single entity from tampering with the keys. ZSKs are generated a few months in advance and used by Verisign (the root zone maintainer) to sign the root zone. No one gets to see the private part of the KSK. So there is no way to compel ICANN to produce bad signatures.

Ok, well back to compelling Verisign. Certainly they are able to sign zones, although that authority flows from ICANN.

> Finally, glue records aren't signed!

If glue records aren't signed, then why wouldn't an adversary simply modify the glue records to omit the DNSSEC content? Maybe you're making a technical argument that the whole root zone is signed, not its individual components?

[matthew9219]

Admittedly, the US is a bit of a special case because of ICANN. Better examples are probably Saudi Arabia, Israel, Australia, Russia, etc.