It was an aeroplane read that shouldn’t have been. The principal charges I recall against Kissinger were these:
- that he generally failed to inform himself on the history of the region and thought in generalities (‘peaceful Bengalis’, etc.) instead of reading reports from the region seriously and in depth;
- that he overestimated the importance of Pakistan as a bridge to China, and consequently (and irrationally) attempted to support Pakistan;
- that he did not seem to understand the nature of the geopolitical position that would emerge after the war, seemed to ignore the Anglophile and pro-US tendencies of the middle class intellectuals underpinning the Bengali nationalist movement and Awami League, ignored the risk of lasting resentment (which hasn’t, in fact happened in the Bangladeshi case but arguably is one reason for lasting Indian Russophilia) consequent on American actions in the crisis; and
- that he seemed to ignore the possibility that the Bengalis might win, and instead doubled down until it really was obvious.
Now, maybe Kissinger overall was still an excellent strategist (although I’d disagree.) But even if he was, Kissinger still had extremely strong preconceptions, which weren’t always obvious to those with whom he interacted. And those preconceptions were quite hard to change. So even if Kissinger was in some ideal sense more rational than others through his strategic understanding, for the purposes of actually interacting with other people, he wasn’t: you’d have to guess what his preconceptions were, and you’d have very great trouble changing them to align with his other objectives.
> Giving an astonishing inside view of how the White House really works in a crisis, The Blood Telegram is an unprecedented chronicle of a pivotal but little-known chapter of the Cold War. Gary J. Bass shows how Nixon and Kissinger supported Pakistan’s military dictatorship as it brutally quashed the results of a historic free election. The Pakistani army launched a crackdown on what was then East Pakistan (today an independent Bangladesh), killing hundreds of thousands of people and sending ten million refugees fleeing to India—one of the worst humanitarian crises of the twentieth century.
> Nixon and Kissinger, unswayed by detailed warnings of genocide from American diplomats witnessing the bloodshed, stood behind Pakistan’s military rulers. Driven not just by Cold War realpolitik but by a bitter personal dislike of India and its leader Indira Gandhi, Nixon and Kissinger actively helped the Pakistani government even as it careened toward a devastating war against India. They silenced American officials who dared to speak up, secretly encouraged China to mass troops on the Indian border, and illegally supplied weapons to the Pakistani military—an overlooked scandal that presages Watergate.