[KryDos]

Does it mean that at the moment of releasing 2.0.4 the Trezor team already knew there is a fake firmware circling around?

I wonder if Trezor team communicated that in some maybe different way than that line in the CHANGELOG. Not blaming them of course, just wondering.

[grumple]

From 2018: https://blog.trezor.io/psa-non-genuine-trezor-devices-979b64...

From their forum earlier this year: https://forum.trezor.io/t/protect-from-getting-a-fake-trezor...

[lxgr]

None of the methods proposed by Trezor would frustrate the attack mentioned in the article:

Validate the holograms: Most users aren't forensic experts and don't have an authentic physical sample to compare their evaluation target to, only photos of one.

Only buy from authorized resellers such as the official Amazon shop: Fake products have been introduced into Amazon's supply chain before [1].

The bootloader validates the firmware and displays a warning otherwise: Sure, but so does the fraudsters' bootloader.

[1] https://www.redpoints.com/blog/amazon-commingled-inventory-m...

[grumple]

From that article, it sounds like this wouldn't be commingled inventory, as it's both private label and an opt in process.

That said the obvious way to avoid amazon commingling conclusively is to buy it directly from the Trezor shop.

[londons_explore]

If I were Trezor and became aware of a fake firmware, I would:

* Offer rewards to anyone able to send me the fake devices or clues who is making them.

* Tell my clients to upgrade the firmware on devices before use. Make sure every new firmware is distinctive in some way - for example the boot screen, and tell the users to check for that to ensure they are actually running the firmware they thought they just flashed.

[StingyJelly]

More sophisticated version of the malicious firmware could try to patch the new ota firmware image on the fly. Once compromised - always compromised.

[londons_explore]

It's hard to reliably binary patch something unknown ahead of time.

All Trezor would need to do is change the compilation options on a fairly regular basis, and any patching will fail.

Combine with the fact there is a reward to send in devices means they can analyze any evil devices and make sure their instructions to users will reliably detect all evil devices they're aware of.

Still doesn't stop supply chain attacks, but makes them far harder.

[radicaldreamer]

Seems like this could also be an insider threat where someone at Trezor knew all the BOM details and could pull this off

[wmf]

Trezor is mostly open hardware and open source firmware to begin with.