[swapfile]

>If you think your traffic is not being monitored over Tor, then you have thought incorrectly.

Tor exit nodes can only monitor traffic for a very short period of time, you create a new circuit and pick an entirely new path through the network very often.

>This does not happen by default, meaning all of your traffic is mixed together. It doesn't matter that it migrates routes every so often.

Absolutely true, a solution to this is to use Whonix or Tails which automatically stream isolates all pre-installed programs, therefore correlation by circuit sharing is impossible. Unfortunately that does not work on a phone, but in the end, using Tor for this is no worse than a VPN.

>Exit nodes don't know where the traffic is coming from, until, of course, you accidentally access your personal domain name over HTTPS

This seems like a straw man. There's not many options to Tor. A VPN will know where you're coming from by default.

[conradev]

> you create a new circuit and pick an entirely new path through the network very often

It is every 10 minutes: https://support.torproject.org/about/change-paths/

> This seems like a straw man. There's not many options to Tor.

It wasn't intended to be a straw man, it was intended to highlight the complexity of hiding your identity online. Tor is indeed one of the best mixnets out there, but it is _not_ a panacea, and if used incorrectly can actually make your privacy _worse_.

The Tor Project itself has official guidelines on how to use Tor safely when you do need it: Tails or Tor Browser. Recommendations that stray from this, from an engineer not familiar with Tor, can actually be _harmful_.