[coastermug]

How does a PE manager expect to make money if their asset stripping decreases the value of the businesses? I’m assuming the value of the business plummets, but they use the sale of assets to pay themselves/their investors? Could someone please explain how this asset stripping is profitable on a portfolio level? - No sarcasm in this question, I’m genuinely interested.

[lesuorac]

Well, as described in the article, the business (not the PE management company) is liable for the debts while the PE company rakes in fees (from the business to the PE company) as the business flounders.

So, if I (as a PE company) buy a hospital for say 5B. Have it take out 3B in loans, sells 3B of assets, and pay the me (as the PE company) 6B in management fees I'll come out 1B ahead. The hospital is technically 1B in the hole but when it declares bankruptcy I don't have to bail it out, the debt is just wiped and I get to keep the 1B.

Afaik, not talked about in the article but you can also treat companies as a reverse annuity. Take out a huge loan against the companies future revenue and use that money now. Of course if the company goes bankrupt in the process you get to keep it because it's your (PE companies's) money and not the companies.

[coastermug]

So this is why I ask about profitability -at the portfolio level-. In your and the article’s example, the PE manager turns a profit not because he screws the business, but because he also screws the bank who loaned money. What bank will continue to loan to companies managed by PE if they expect them to asset strip and default on the loans?

[chii]

> Take out a huge loan against the companies future revenue

so who is lending this money, and why would they risk the lending if they knew that it's quite possible for bankruptcy to happen?

If there's enough assets to collateralize the loan, then the business is not in the hole after all?