[skissane]

> That's not the point. You are confusing phylosophy and politics.

I don't agree I am. On the contrary, there is a lot of philosophical debate on the relationship between pragmatism and truth – https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-pragmatic/ – and I think what I'm saying makes sense if you assume a certain position in that debate (albeit one which I'd expect Benatar would reject)

Obviously, in the short-run, the popularity of a belief tells us nothing about its truth. But what about the popularity of a belief in the very long-run, in the limit of future time? If we somehow knew that, as t approaches infinity (or the future extinction of humanity), believers in a proposition will inevitably outnumber its disbelievers, would that in itself be evidence that the proposition is true? Personally, I say yes. I don't know if Benatar has written anything on this topic, but I assume he'd have to say no, since yes implies the falsehood of his published work.

> He is carefully building an argument that if we consider an axiomatisation of ethics where causing pain is bad and getting pleasure is positive, it can be argued that life is actually a poor deal

I think it is interesting, but for the opposite reason he thinks – if consequentialism/utilitarianism (or at least some versions thereof) produces that conclusion, to me that's another nail in the coffin of consequentialism/utilitarianism (or at least those versions of it).

> Parfit himself spent a significant part of his career unsuccessfully looking for an axiomatisation of population ethics

I've read Reasons and Persons. I think his discussions of the theory of personal identity are very informative, even though I don't agree with his materialist/physicalist premises. His contributions to ethics fascinate me less, because I don't believe in consequentialism, and I doubt ethics is axiomatisable

[WastingMyTime89]

> On the contrary, there is a lot of philosophical debate on the relationship between pragmatism and truth – https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-pragmatic/ – and I think what I'm saying makes sense if you assume a certain position in that debate (albeit one which I'd expect Benatar would reject)

I don't think there is a debate in the sense that one true proposition has to win over another one. You can build sound arguments for different positions based on varying premises.

I can't find flaws in what Benatar says. I don't entirely agree with his premises and it's easy to counterbalance them if you are so incline - you can take a religious angle and argue than eternal salvation counterbalance pain during life or a progressist one and argue that the suffering of the current generation are offset by their absence for the future ones - but I still find them valuable. From my point of view, it definitely is a valuable contribution to the philosophy of ethics.

> I doubt ethics is axiomatisable

I'm curious about how you propose we discuss and study ethics if you don't think it can be based on exposed principles.

[skissane]

> I don't think there is a debate in the sense that one true proposition has to win over another one. You can build sound arguments for different positions based on varying premises.

I mean the idea that we should decide between competing sets of premises on their long-term practical prospects of becoming widely accepted is itself a premise we can consider. And having adopted that premise, we can use it to conclude that Benatar's conclusion is false. Which implies that the negation of that premise is one of Benatar's premises, even if not one he ever made explicit. And thus, we've actually learn something about the assumptions underlying Benatar's position.

> I don't entirely agree with his premises and it's easy to counterbalance them if you are so incline - you can take a religious angle and argue than eternal salvation counterbalance pain during life or a progressist one and argue that the suffering of the current generation are offset by their absence for the future ones - but I still find them valuable.

Maybe there are other ways of counterbalancing them. Population ethics seems to assume all relevant goods are fungible. If some of the relevant goods are non-fungible, the whole enterprise would turn out to be based on a false assumption.

> From my point of view, it definitely is a valuable contribution to the philosophy of ethics.

I never said his contribution was worthless. Sometimes, a person can make a valuable contribution even while being wrong–e.g. by helping to clarify the space of possible arguments, the lay of the land.

> I'm curious about how you propose we discuss and study ethics if you don't think it can be based on exposed principles.

Can we axiomatise history? Can we axiomatise psychotherapy? In both cases, I think the subject is inherently unaxiomatisable. But that doesn't mean it is impossible to approach rationally. We just have to accept that rigorous formal methods of deduction, which the term "axiomatisation" implies, while a perfectly appropriate methodology for some disciplines, has for others at best occasional applicability