[_kbh_]

> My expectation is that all NSA CNSA[1] encryption standards are backdoored at the implementation level (by the NSA who uses Suite A for its own communication and I suspect military communications outside of that in weapons systems that can fall into enemy hands)

CNSA / NSA Suite B are pretty much entirely public encryption standards that have stood up to public scrutiny for decades at this point.

They are also approved by the USA to encrypt TS SCI information, why would they approve that if they had backdoors?.

[pffft8888]

Why would they have Suite A then?

[_kbh_]

> Why would they have Suite A then?

Because Suite A are a set of non public algorithms that are used to encrypt data.

Them being non public makes it harder to workout how to decrypt the data.

They are also likely protected against a number of attacks that aren't public, even if these attacks aren't feasible against current algorithms.

[mrguyorama]

>They are also likely protected against a number of attacks that aren't public

For reference, see DES, where the NSA adjusted the algorithm to protect from a not publicly understood differential cryptanalysis attack. Many people claimed that the adjustment by the NSA was clear backdooring, though we know that was not true.

It was however purposely deficient in the length of its key, allegedly because "it was good enough" and for export reasons, but also because the NSA considered it easy enough to brute force.

[pffft8888]

"even if these attacks aren't feasible against current algorithms" lol, ok, if you say so....