| I don’t know this spec but my skimming the DTN webpage and the SPP gives me the impression that this architecture is in part designed to insure end-to-end established logical circuits, so in context of [censorship/access-denial] I don’t know if it is a good fit. NASA’s HDTN [1] says it is based on IETF RFC 5050 [2]. Have to read that to understand privacy and censorship implications, specially the Bundle Security Protocol [3]. But just skimming the index in those specs reinforces my impression that this architecture can lockdown/lockout at administrative points. [1]: https://github.com/nasa/HDTN [2]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5050/ [3]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6257 —- from RFC 6257 —- The stressed environment of the underlying networks over which the Bundle Protocol will operate makes it important for the DTN to be protected from unauthorized use, and this stressed environment poses unique challenges for the mechanisms needed to secure the Bundle Protocol. Furthermore, DTNs may very likely been deployed in environments where a portion of the network might become compromised, posing the usual security challenges related to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. -- end -- & p.s. RFC 4838 mentions "optional" security protocols (such as rfc 5050). There is also a "registration" protocol (to allow connection continuity over process restarts) "that may fail". I have to think about this but atm not 100% whether these requirements are inherent to the problem domain (overlay, mix of networks, partitions, ..) |