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by eganist
1161 days ago
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Sorry, I didn't communicate my point well. Agencies, the ones you'd care about, don't spare expenses. If your threat model includes agencies, making an operation expensive isn't your goal because money might as well be infinite. So you target a different resource: Time. It would've taken more time to convince Apple to let the FBI into the San Bernardino shooter's phone than it took for the FBI to use a vendor with a crack for that device and OS. Hence. --- I'm not disagreeing with the value. I'm merely pointing out that if your goal is to tamper with attack economics, you need to target resources that are finite for the adversary. With many state actors, that resource is time. |
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Updates like key transparency don’t perfectly prevent all those things, but they make it less useful to invest in capabilities that might now be incompatible with them, or might get detected because of this feature. They also signify that the organization is hostile to the sorts of exploit that might enable surveillance, and that it’s probably better not to engage with them.
Lastly, government agencies do not have infinite money.