| It is fantastic that a company operating with such horrific practices is dead. While we are at it, when can we fix similar issues below with mainstream financial systems that millions of people are still using? - Social security numbers are used as a secret for identification, despite being in plaintext and having so low entropy as to be guessable, and originally issued on a card literally saying "Not for Identification". - Every bank check lists the bank account number, which serves as the only information needed for a party to issue a request to withdraw money from that account. - Credit card numbers are similarly a private number used as a public number, and printed on plaintext on the card. Is there any effort working on bringing asymmetric encryption to these systems or to replace them that has a reasonable chance of working? |
The same principle (i.e. knowing an account number means being able to debit it) works surprisingly well in many European countries for direct debits, and the account number is considered even less of a secret than it is in the US. For example, many freelances routinely print it on their invoices sent out to clients, have it as part of their e-mail signature, or even prominently feature it on their website.
What makes it work is that, under the SEPA Direct Debit framework, the risk of fraud and insufficient funds is 100% on the party initiating the direct debit. An accountholder can literally click a button on their bank's app or website and they get the funds back immediately, no questions asked, within 8 weeks of the original debit date.
This, in turn, means that it is in the initiating party's self-interest to only accept this form of payment in high-trust situations, and not just like a low-fee replacement for credit and debit cards that shifts some amount of fraud risk to the accountholder or their bank.