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by angus-prune
1163 days ago
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The current problem is that the insentives are all wrong. It is the company being audited that gives the auditers the business. Its not in the interests of a dodgy company to appoint a good auditor, and its not actually in the auditors (short term) interest to uncover wrongdoing as it just means they'd lose a client. My proposal is that you require every company to have insurance to cover the risks, making the insurers fully liable for fraud (and any other business risk that audits protect against). Companies then don't appoint their own auditors, but the insurers do. Its in the insurers interest to make sure that any audit is effective as they're on the hook for any liability the audit misses. This way the insentives for the auditors are aligned with the interests of the people relying on the audit (shareholders, customers, suppliers). |
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Rating agencies were, and are, paid by bond issuers are rated a bunch of synthetic real estate backed bonds as very safe. But then on top of that, certain of these bonds were insured—-notably by AIG. However, AIG just rubber stamped the ratings and ended up going bankrupt when the crisis hit.
The real mismatch of incentives is one layer deeper than your comment suggests. An insurance company CEO can do very well for himself underpricing insurance. The business grows as premiums roll in and he collects a bunch of bonuses. When the SHTF he could just resign and collect his golden parachute.