[danbmil99]

> John Searle, broadly, framed the issue correctly in the 80s and the standard critiques are wrong.

The standard critiques are not wrong, IMNSHO. Searle's Chinese Room is facile mind-poison. It is an unfalsifiable hypothesis.

What if I could simulate physics down to the molecular level, including simulating a human brain? Would that be conscious? If not why not?

And if I ran that simulation (a bit slowly, granted) by having that guy from the Chinese Room manually run the simulation, painstakingly following the instruction code of that simulation, would the fact that the simulation is being implemented by someone who unrelatedly is conscious himself, have any bearing on the scenario?

Searle's argument here is "Not Even Wrong".

[tern]

I recommend watching the interview with Andres. When we adopt a defensible model of consciousness, it becomes clear that simulations of things are different from the things being simulated, and as such we cannot expect them to be conscious in the same way.

I once also thought Searle was 'not even wrong'—you need to go down the rabbit hole.