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by indymike
1178 days ago
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> The USAF and USN are just incredibly unwilling to have to compromise I don't think that is the case. The issue is that most of the joint programs fail because they start with such a broad difference in requirements the program can't work. Here are two examples: F-111/TFX - Navy wanted a fleet interceptor / air superiority fighter built around the Phoenix Missile. Air Force wanted a heavy attack aircraft. The F-111 led to the Navy having to do a crash development to get the F-14 Tomcat. F-16 LWF - Navy wanted a twin engine. AF wanted single engine. Joint program died immediately... so we the taxpayers ended up with the USAF buying F-16 (great aircraft) and the Navy ordering an update on the YF-17 which became the F/A-18 Hornet (another great aircraft). Incidentally, the YF-17 was a twin engine iteration of the F-5 (which is an iteration of the T-38 Talon), and the F/A-18 is an iteration of the YF-17. > for most of the cold war had the budgets and supplier diversity to acquire entirely separately. I think you are on to something: lack of supplier diversity will be a forcing function in the future... |
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Agreeing on requirements is the most important compromise. You can always come up with different requirements that make collaboration impossible. Sometimes these differing requirements are fundamental - e.g. the E-2 and E-3 (E-7 in the future), while performing similar roles, are necessarily very different platforms - that a joint program would never be considered. Sometimes these requirements are not so fundamental - e.g. the many years of single-engine versus twin-engine disagreement - that a joint program is possible, albeit challenging.
While the JSF program has had plenty of issues, the fact that it has been successful in delivering the envisioned aircraft is a testament to (a) technology improving to the point that many once-dealbreaker requirements (e.g. single-engine) could be swept aside, (b) the rise in costs making it clear that completely separate development programs were impractical, and (c) explicitly providing requirements flexibility via the "family-of-aircraft" approach (no way the F-35C would have been acceptable financially to anyone other than the USN, no way the F-35A would have been suitable for carrier use).
> ...lack of supplier diversity will be a forcing function in the future...
The consolidation of the 90s and 2000s is directly the consequence of lower budgets. Consider the fighter/strike fleets of the 1980s:
- USAF: A-7 (LTV), A-10 (FR), F-4 (MD), F-15 (MD), F-16 (GD), F-111 (GD), F-117 (Lockheed)
- USN: A-6 (Grumman), A-7 (LTV), F-4 (MD), F-14 (Grumman), F/A-18 (MD)
versus today:
- USAF: A-10 (none), F-15 (Boeing), F-15E (Boeing), F-16 (LM), F-22 (LM), F-35A (LM)
- USN: F/A-18E/F (Boeing), F-35C (LM)
there's just not enough business to support much more than the Boeing/LM duopoly keeping both production/support running and enough capability to be competitive for the NGAD programs.