[nordsieck]

> That's my understanding but it is kind of a distressing conclusion. SVB had no enterprise value, and the outcome we're getting is financially the same for FDIC as if they just firesold the assets and did a pure winddown?

Could you explain why that's a distressing conclusion?

[collectedparts]

Part of me wanted to believe that SVB's failure wouldn't lead to real financial losses for the FDIC. That there was a weird panic bank run, and then the steady hand of a regulator was needed, but there really were enough assets.

Not saying I studied the data and concluded that; it's just what I wanted to believe.

$20b loss to FDIC insurance fund feels high. It still meets the technical definition of "no losses borne by taxpayers" but it's a lot of money. I've gotta believe it's among the largest ever if not the largest ever losses borne by the FDIC for a single bank failure.

Distressing – some combination of having been in denial about just how screwed up SVB was financially, paired with concern for what this will mean if the dominos keep falling.

[Lazare]

It is a weirdly high number. I can only assume it represents some sort of conservative "worst case" estimate, but so far I haven't seen any comprehensive breakdown.

And yes, if it does cost $20b, it will be the most expensive single bank failure (exceeding IndyMac).

[bradleyjg]

If only one thing comes out of this debacle it should be a ban on hold to maturity accounting practices.

[blitzar]

When Is a “Mark” Not a Mark? When It’s a Venture Capital Mark

https://a16z.com/2016/09/01/marks-offmark/

[sokoloff]

That is almost surely an excessive reaction.

Limits (possibly to include prohibitions) on using H2M accounting to back demand deposits would be a more targeted (and therefore appropriate) intervention.

[Lazare]

...no, I really don't think that follows.