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by amalter
1191 days ago
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There's no moral hazard if we pay out depositors and let the bank fail. The big "problem" in 2008 was that the bailed out banks were made whole with equity injections and then continued to grow. (Although the government did quite well on those investments). SVB is dead. Shareholders are getting zero. The losses are not being socialized. But because we don't want a bank run on every regional bank, let's make depositors whole. |
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Obviously that insurance costs something, and the moral hazard is that both bank owners and depositors of banks with lax standards get to financially benefit from lower costs due to all federal taxpayers subsidizing their risk.
Anytime taxpayers give money, they are tilting the incentives such that the risk of the loss being bailed out is now going to be underpriced, because it will be assumed a bailout is coming.
If the goal is to have no depositor in the US ever lose any money, then the government should just give everyone an account they can transfer money into and out of. It will earn no interest, and no bank owners will profit from the taxpayers’ subsidy.