[dragonwriter]

> The day before SVB fell, everybody said everything was fine.

Well, no, people were saying “Get your money out of SVB if its above the insurance limit”, because the run was already happening and that SVB couldn’t handle the run was a pretty widespread opinion.

But, while there are systemic/institutional/regulatory reasons why SVB’s conduct which created the vulnerability was possible, it doesn’t seem that the vulnerability itself is systemic in a way which makes other similar failures likely to be imminent.

[Scoundreller]

Wouldn't we expect a lot of orgs to suddenly start caring if they have more than $250k in their accounts and start spreading it out over the next week, or removing it from banks entirely and putting into treasuries or other assets?

Or withdrawing entirely from niche/smaller banks and into bigger/more diversified ones?

(diversified banks are great because payday becomes mostly book entries instead of massive inflows/outflows on payday)

[dragonwriter]

> Wouldn’t we expect a lot of orgs to suddenly start caring if they have more than $250k in their accounts and start spreading it out over the next week, or removing it from banks entirely and putting into treasuries or other assets?

I’d expect big orgs to mostly have money in banks specifically for reasonable cash needs (or temporary inbound flowthrough), and to have it in treasuries or other assets otherwise, but I wouldn’t expect to see much change. There’s no news here impacting accounts in other banks: the $250K insurance limit isn’t news, and there’s no reason to think that SVBs particular concentration of assets in long-maturity illiquid assets that have lost value is systemic rather than sui generis.

The ripple effects that will occur, I would think, will be more through companies that were dependent on SVB than companies with money in other banks.