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by rcme
1192 days ago
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I disagree with the overall learning from SVB’s collapse. Bonds are safe. The learning, to me, is that keeping interest rates at zero for too long distorts expectations in an unsafe way. What did SVB do wrong, exactly? They took in a lot of money, i.e. they ran a successful business. And they bought safe assets with that money. Who at the time would have disagreed with their strategy? The issue is that the Fed created expectations that interest rates had a reasonable chance of staying 0 for the next decade. This blame falls squarely with Powell. He lowered rates in 2019, well before the pandemic. Who can blame someone for seeing near-0 rates in 2019 and believing they would stay that way well into the 2020s? Also worth noting that SVB was not the only one to belief this. The market, in general, was supporting insanely high valuations whose only justification was near-0 rates well in to the future. |
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>And they bought safe assets with that money.
The point is that you can't buy 100B of bonds and say "oh bonds are safe". When you buy low yield bonds with a 10 year maturation you're inherently betting that rates aren't going to rise since their valuation will go down if rates rise.
When you're a bank risk management does not involve hoping the fed doesn't raise interest rates. Sometimes you make the wrong bet but you recognize your mistake, take the loss and sell those T-Bonds earlier. Then you plan your communication to clearly explain why so that a bank run doesn't happen.
It seems the one of the pieces in the chain is that there was a big disconnect between the internal perception of the magnitude of the problem and what was communicated. Silicon Valley VCs and startups are twitchy right now and they tried to exit this position too late with too little explanation and got hit with a very old and very traditional bank run.