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by jmoss20
1198 days ago
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The problem with this view is Hilary Putnam's "a rock implements every finite state automata". (Nicely explained, with a rebuttal in [0].) It's an attractive idea that some thing has agency (or consciousness, or whatever property you want to define) to the extent it does some sort of computation. But then you have to go figure out what it means for something to do that computation. That turns out to be extremely difficult; most things can be interpreted as computing most other things. [0]: https://philpapers.org/rec/CHADAR |
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Chalmers paper is behind a paywall but I dont see how your point makes any sense. A rock is not processing anything, an insect or a person or a calculator is. Seems pretty straightforward to me.
The states that Putnam argues are happening inside the rock dont mean anything unless some action results from them. You'll notice I mentioned 'actions as a result of processing' above.