[JoshCole]

I think philosophical literacy is probably higher now than at any point in the past. For one, a greater deal of the philosophical writing is now existent than was in the past. For another, the selection effects have weeded out much of the writing that was bad. For yet another, a far greater percentage of the population is literate than in the past. For yet another, the population is healthier, wealthier, and generally better able to apply themselves to the material than they were in the past. For yet another, being after rather than before the Enlightenment, questioning of assumption is actually a much more prevalent reflex now than it was in the past. For yet another, our information retrieval systems help us do a better job of organizing the and discovering the relevant writing.

I also think philosophical literacy is less relevant than it was in the past. For example, we are talking about how an agent's decision making algorithm is in actuality. Is philosophy the best subject to discuss this? Control theory, learning theory, game theory, scientific investigation into the brain's processes are all mature enough that their usage produces more rewarding outcomes.

So lets say we see what at first glance appears to be degenerate twitch chat zoomer spam about philosophy sus no cap? Are they really philosophically unsophisticated? Or were they raised in a world of such greater philosophical sophistication that self-replicating knowledge structures - like, say, memes, were something they had extreme and constant exposure to? What if they are engaging in some sort of coordinated omegalul gambit?

I'm joking, but I'm kind of serious.

https://xkcd.com/603/

I often find that explaining observed incompetence with genius works better than explaining observed incompetence with incompetence. So I'm more fond of claiming a problem is hard for good reasons then that people just weren't educated - which is also often true, by the way, just explaining why I ended up putting the emphasis somewhere else.

[strogonoff]

> For example, we are talking about how an agent's decision making algorithm is in actuality.

What is “agent”? If a deterministic universe without free will is considered, whatever “agent” means is likely nonsensical so if you are discussing whether or not the universe is deterministic then presuming existence of an agent (with agency) is a mistake. So no, in a discussion on whether the universe is deterministic we would not be talking about that, whatever that is, if apparently presumes existence of an agent.

> Are they really philosophically unsophisticated? Or were they raised in a world of such greater philosophical sophistication that self-replicating knowledge structures - like, say, memes, were something they had extreme and constant exposure to? What if they are engaging in some sort of coordinated omegalul gambit?

I didn’t mean just newer generations by “people today”. Discussing this with older people is as difficult and they tend to equally just make assumptions instead of reasoning. I like discussing topics like these the most with a gen Z philosophy professor a few years younger than me.

[JoshCole]

Not arguing nondeterministic universes. Within a universe agents see computationally irreducible phenomenon. It is just game theory decision problems embedded in cellular automata. The agent which says they could have decided another way is correct - their modeling of the problem did in fact have that property. The agents which thinks this insane and improper modeling are suffering from a hindsight fallacy.

[JoshCole]

In case that wasn't enough:

Try considering a Turing Machine which is running several Turing Machines within it. Call it A. Within it are B and C. B gets an input state that is the entire Turing Machine. Meanwhile C gets the output of B. There are multiple B and multiple BC. So we get something like this when we write it out:

A = B + B + B + BC + BC + BC

You might be tempted to say that A = A, therefore A is deterministic. This would even be logically true. However, it is actually far more dangerous than it appears. Why? Well, you aren't A. You are within A. Lets say you are B within A. Does it matter that you know the dynamics function? It is deterministic, but does it follow from it being deterministic that it is deterministic? No! Even though B is within the deterministic system A, B cannot claim that A is deterministic, because B cannot claim that C is deterministic, because C is indeterminable by B through self-reference.

Now the standard mistake is to let B run then let C run then to pretend B could determine C, because now obviously we can tell that A was determined by B because C was determined by B. Which sounds really compelling, but ask yourself this to see why it isn't as great as you think it is: is the universe still subject to a deterministic dynamics function right now? If so, can you tell me what C is, not in the toy problem, but in the real world?

Like, I realize this is an impossible problem: I'm asking you for the current configuration over the course of the next second for all matter in our universe even the parts you can't model because you haven't observed it. But that is kind of my point. The universe hasn't stopped running yet. You can't determine C from the information context of B.

[JoshCole]

Now lets say you try to counter, ah, but A so therefore all the other stuff is meaningless.

It seems like it works, but lets talk about the parable of the time you were given a deterministic dynamics function and you computed it according to what it was because you wanted to claim it was deterministic by treating it as what it was.

So you start calculating B + B + B + BC + BC + BC. And you see me looking at the same problem and idiotic like I am, you see me write down A = A' = BC. Then I get ready to solve it. And you are like, pfft, what an idiot. He isn't even talking about, like, actual reality.

unfortunately, in the calculations that follow, you realize something strange: Though you may B, I C you. And because I see you before you be such that I can determine what C should be such that you cannot see C while you B be, I choose a C for your B so that your B doesn't see C.

Basically, in choosing the slowest path, you also choose to be determinable, but in choosing being determinable, you implicitly make yourself vulnerable to an A' that makes your context - during the process - undecidable.

You thought choosing A saved you, but actually it was your curse:

You let me set A = B + B + B + A' because you didn't want to claim that we could divide A into the pieces which it was in actuality composed. But because it was in actuality composed of those pieces BC is now calculatable by A' such that your conceit is actually what traps you in the non-deterministic perspective. If B was calculated, not via A's conception of B, but A' then now it isn't just B that can't predict C. C probably can't predict B either.

[JoshCole]

So lets escape this! Lets say the process ends! Now B has fully determined itself such that C is determined and now A is determined as well.

Is A now deterministic? No, A isn't anything anymore.

Nothing is happening.

A isn't now deterministic; A was determined and now our physics is stopped. Where is the determinism at? Not within A, because clearly during A B wasn't deterministic because of self-reference to C. Not afterward either, because now it isn't doing anything.