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by evilsetg
1209 days ago
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Can you explain how you know that neither a toaster, your wristwatch nor ChatGPT are conscious?
If being conscious means being conscious like a human this would be obvious but maybe the toaster is just conscious like a toaster.
Is a bug conscious? |
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Even so. For us, consciousness is just there.
Externally we attribute consciousness to certain behaviours, including (but not limited to) self-reference, goal-seeking, physical and social responsiveness, use of language, memory, and so on.
These two things are not the same. We assume other humans are conscious in the same way we are to the extent that they perform consciousness. We can't be sure, but for human interactions it's a workable proxy.
A toaster, a watch, a rock, and a web server don't perform consciousness in any way at all. They may have some kind of metaphyiscal awareness, or not, but if they do we can't see it, and without a comprehensive theory of consciousness it's parsimonious to assume they're not aware.
ChatGPT performs some elements of consciousness, but not others. It happens to perform the elements AI researchers consider important - specifically use of language. But it doesn't have a memory for previous conversations, it doesn't show any independent goal seeking, and so on.
It uses "I..." and a vast amount of human training to mimic the appearance of consciousness, and plenty of humans seem to want to believe that's enough.
But the essence of the hard problem is the difference between "performs the actions we associate with consciousness" and "is conscious in the same way we know we are."
You could argue that practically there's no difference, and from one point of view that may be true. But that doesn't work if you want to understand what's happening rather than just assuming in a "well obviously..." kind of a way.
If only because historically in science "well obviously..." has been consistently wrong.