[Lyapunov_Lover]

That's the (hard) problem of qualia. You can't say for sure that ChatGPT doesn't experience anything. And I can't say for sure that you do, either. It's trivial to dismiss it on the basis of "well obviously it's like that"—far more difficult is to say something about why it's not like that.

I think consciousness has to be the product of an algorithmic process. I think this process can be summed up as "prediction". I don't think there's some secret quantum/soul/magic aspect to it. Which is why I think it's plausible that transformer models may capture some aspect of what we refer to as consciousness, though I don't quite buy it at a gut level.

You say that "it's not even comparable to the experience of a simple invertebrate," but that's just you writing down what your gut is telling you. What is the experience of a simple invertebrate like, exactly?

[vba616]

>You can't say for sure that ChatGPT doesn't experience anything. And I can't say for sure that you do, either.

The question rattling around in my brain tonight is - if some, many, people don't develop a theory of mind as young children, how many of the people around me are like this? Is it just the philosophers?

It seems of much more moment than the essence of ChatGPT.

[messe]

Given how many people in this thread don’t seem to grasp the idea of qualia, and think the hard problem of consciousness to be easy, I’m not entirely unconvinced I’m surrounded by a bunch of imperfect p-zombies.

[vba616]

People without a theory of mind are not p-zombies. They are people who see others as p-zombies.

Given that, I'm not sure how to interpret your comment as it seems to describe an invalid inference.