| I don't think it's a false dilemma, because the essence of mathematical platonism isn't really that forms exist, but that these forms are how the universe really works. They're not an approximation, a metaphor, or a point of view. They're the real deal - the base mechanisms. And they can be discovered through the scientific process, with its combination of physical and speculative analysis. Clearly this is nonsense. Math isn't truly self-consistent, physical research is limited to a range of lab-friendly experiments garnished with some astrophysical guesswork, and all of it gets filtered through consciousness, which we have no clue about. What we have is a "looking for the key under the light" situation where can only explore the things we can see. We don't know what's in the dark, and it's actually very likely that our consciousness is extremely limited and unable to perceive essential detail. But because (tautologically) we can't see it we just assume it's not there, and our tiny and contingent view is gloriously universal. I find the cat metaphor very revealing. Cats share a space with us but they literally do not see the same objects we do. They perceive weight, texture, and dimensions, they're far more sensitive to smell, and they have some innate models for dynamics and mechanics. But they have no concept of the meaning of a book, a laptop, a wifi card, a Netflix subscription, or a mathematical description of General Relativity. Unless we breed them specially for intelligence for a good few tens of millennia they never will, because cat consciousness is too small to contain those concepts. It's ridiculously, almost comically naive to believe - purely on faith - that human consciousness isn't severely limited in some analogous ways. We're quite good at the human equivalent of hunting for food - which includes manipulating physical materials and crude energy sources, with some meta-awareness of abstraction. What are the odds that's all there is to understand about the universe? |
Consider Euclidean geometry, which is fine, mathematically, but, it turns out, not how the universe works. If mathematical platonists were concerned about whether mathematics' forms are how the universe really works, surely they would insist on the verification of their axioms before proceeding? And then, would mathematical platonism not be just the uncontroversial parts of the physical sciences?
The author reprises the platonism / formalism issue in this article's final section, beginning with the paragraph "But there is still more to be said. Perhaps, after all some of those Big Picture questions do remain lurking in the mathematical background." He refers to Platonists as realists, but, I think, in the sense that the forms are real regardless of whether they are how the universe really works.