| So the issue is we are talking about different dimensions of improvement. I concede that WebUSB is better sandboxed than executing a driver installer (likely running as admin or root) in terms of the blast radius. However, WebUSB is catastrophically worse than an installer in terms of the ability of the infection to occur in the first place. Both because of the aforementioned difficulty of user process of software installation, as well as the additional checks the OS and/or third party antivirus does, as opposed to Google's fairly limited abuse detection capabilities (just Safe Browsing in WebUSB's case, I imagine?). This is a problem I have talked about many times before regarding Google's security outlook. On Project Zero there's a ton of interesting and surely exciting work into novel ways to compromise systems. ...That work has basically no bearing on improving security for the billions of users who will never be targeted in such a niche technical way. Real world compromise tends to just be social engineering people into doing what Google explicitly permits websites to do. You could remove malicious activity from a billion users right now by simply... deleting the Notifications API from Chrome, which is principally used to spam ads. Because people mash that allow button all the time, every time. I'd best guess I see ten times the malware in Chrome (either hijacker extensions delivered by the Chrome Web Store, push notifications from random adult websites, or both) than actual installed malicious software on a given Windows machine. And this is fixable! Google could fix this with WebUSB and make a net positive all around! Likely by redesigning permission granting in the browser to require deeper user intent. But it would require a fundamental change in how Google understands and perceives security (and it'd likely reduce engagement stats for some features, which various teams would fight), and I've been beating this drum for several years and I don't really expect it to change. (In fact, one specific change I could recommend: I think APIs like WebUSB, as well as the Notifications API and similar, should probably be completely blocked unless you install a PWA. It's not as much process as a Windows software install, but it's a clear gate to allowing a site more ability, and installing and removing apps is a far easier concept to explain to users than navigating the site privacy settings.) |
We're not talking about any vulnerability here, this is social engineering. There is no amount of confirmation that can be required or warnings added that a confidence trickster cannot walk you through dismissing. The only solution is to limit what you're allowed to do with your own computer.
That's a really high price to pay.