[captn3m0]

> Any virus would have to exploit a system vulnerability

XKCD 1200[0] disagrees:

> If someone steals my laptop while I'm logged in, they can read my email, take my money, and impersonate me to my friends, but at least they can't install drivers without my permission.

[0]: https://xkcd.com/1200/

[kaba0]

That’s one of my favorite xkcd comics because it describes the (very dire) situation so well. Unfortunately the linux userspace really doesn’t seem to care about security even a tiny bit, as if they were still living in the early days of computing where you could be naively trusting everything. And fortunately open-source software is indeed well-mannered for the most time, but that is no reason to be delusional.

Mobile OSs are way ahead in terms of security and the other two major desktop Os also does at least some mitigation against potential attacks. Yet our .ssh folder, web cache, backups everything can be read/written from the same user account one uses for npm installing any random package which has the potential to just encrypt your whole home directory..

[captn3m0]

I'm hopeful about efforts like bubblewrap, but widespread adoption is very tough. As long as policies are delegated (like AppArmor), I don't see that improving.

TPMs and Passkeys are also a good refuge - Just keep private material off the device.

What I'd like to see is a boundary between system installed packages (which I implicitly trust, but worried about malicious commits upstream, as others have noted) and other code, such as installed via pip, npm, cargo etc.

While it's feasible for me to audit a single shell script, or a PKGBUILD from AUR, it's pretty impossible for modern lanaguage package managers.