The big problem with this line of reasoning is that good developers hate working with bad developers. So if you don't do something about bad developers (which might just mean train them, not necessarily fire them), then the good developers will leave.
That is circle reasoning, if you know which developers are good so you can ask them then you already know which developers are bad.
And asking good developers to identify good developers doesn't work either. Good developers hates working with bad developers, true, but like all other humans they hate working with all sorts of people for different reason so they will point out a lot of good developers as well.
Instead what works is if you have lots of data from diverse group of good developers. That way the personal noise gets cancelled out and you are mostly left with the "I don't like bad developers" signal. This isn't trivial data to get though, especially since people usually choose to work with people like themselves so a team likely isn't diverse enough to get you this kind of data, and people from other teams aren't familiar enough to give good data either.
If a bad manager keeps only bad developers around it will kill a (software) company just as fast as anything else. It turns out that paying customers like their software to work and be free of data corruption.
Speed == probability of survival for startups. You only have so much runway; better developer productivity means more swings of the bat at finding PMF.
What we are arguing is the Chinese room problem coupled with Goodhearts law.
The people that need to interpret the metrics might be a professional that understand their meaning, or they might be an AI following arbitrary instructions. The first group will use the metrics to create a better team, and the second will make people angry.
You could of course blame managers for that, but delaying a game since your bad developers aren't capable of delivering isn't really an option either. How many years will it take those developers to get things right? What they would need is to delay the game and replace the developers with good developers, or scale back the complexity of the game to a level those developers can handle.
The company in question choose the latter, they said they will use unreal engine for future games instead of an inhouse engine. So they admitted their developers aren't good enough.
> "So they admitted their developers aren't good enough."
Build vs. buy is pretty much never a question of developer quality, but a question of ROI. Even with the best devs in the world, building something on par with Unreal (or other commercial engines) is a huge outlay of capital. With relatively little return over a single game, you need multiple hits to pay off the engine.
There aren't a lot of companies that can afford that.
All of those issues were there for their last project as well, but somehow they only failed this time even though they had a much larger budget and larger team with more developers. The most reasonable explanation is "bad devs", even though that will never be an official reason. When you swell the team size quality tend to take a hit, and when the old good devs becomes managers and the new devs try to replicate the work you often get problems.
That article describes how you need to work if you have bad developers. CDP-R assumed that they still had as good developers as they had previously, which wasn't true and that bit them.
"scale" is a problem. It is not the same problem as "bad devs".
All the indicators point to "scale". Having worked in games for almost two decades and having seen anything from solo dev to teams of hundreds, and the growth in between, my experience leads me to say "scale" as well.
Do you have any indicators for the "bad devs" problem? So far, you're just stating it as if it were categorical truth.
Paying a non-trivial portion of your engineers high salaries will kill any startup without unlimited money, regardless of what other guardrails you have in place.