[uconnectlol]

> people will write that the Flipper can't be used for jamming. I've bad news. I will not explain what I did, but I tried to implement an attack to prevent my key from opening my car and I successfully had this jammer working at quite a distance (10 meters). That's not good, and script kiddies should be away from this techniques.

What's not good is that tons of tech now relies on radio garbage for no reason, especially car keys.

[michaelmior]

> tons of tech now relies on radio garbage for no reason, especially car keys.

I'm curious what you mean by "radio garbage" and "for no reason."

[uconnectlol]

For instance, car keys.

[ramesh31]

>For instance, car keys.

Have you ever owned a push button start vehicle? It is a strictly superior UX.

[sliken]

Strictly superior? Dunno, not sure I'd call depending on some additional authentication widget that has a battery that dies every year or so strictly superior.

Doubly so when it's temperature sensitive, so most likely to strand you when you are very cold. If given the choice I'd rather have something that works for the life of the car instead of depending on a battery powered dongle.

[michaelmior]

I'm confused about the "for no reason" part then. I get a lot of value from not having to physically approach my car and use a key to unlock or start it.

[hnarn]

Just to steel man the argument, I think what the parent might mean is that when you move from something that used to be physical security only (a regular key) to something that is now both physical and over radio, or worst case radio only, you are introducing a new medium and because of that you're also introducing a lot of new attack vectors and vulnerabilities.

Presumably the argument is that the benefits you get from this new medium being introduced (being able to unlock your car from a distance) can be argued to not be useful enough to warrant the new issues it brings along with it (verifying the authenticity of the transmission, avoiding jamming, etc.), and one can argue that the Flipper Zero is shining a light on these issues in a new way: they have always been there as fundamental parts of the choice of the radio medium, but they are now easier to exploit.

[michaelmior]

If the argument is that the risks of adding an additional access mechanism outweigh the benefits, I would tend to disagree, but I understand the argument. But since the original comment stated "for no reason," I'm confused about what argument is being made.