[mannykannot]

> What’s your point?

Well, let's go back to my original post in this thread, replying to one where you concluded with "until we know much more about the insides of minds, the 'all observable properties' is a fuzzy indirect set of second-order human behaviors." This statement, like your comments generally, is obviously made under the assumption that other people have minds, and my observation is that, as far as I know, there is no basis for that assumption other than what you call "a fuzzy indirect set of second-order human behaviors." Therefore, each of us individually is faced with a quadrilemma (or whatever the proper term is:) 1) Reject this fuzzy evidence, embrace solipsism, and cease assuming other people are conscious until we have a justification that avoids these alleged flaws; 2) Contingently accept, at least until we know more, the fuzzy evidence from human behaviors as grounds for thinking other people are conscious; 3) Inconsistently reject the fuzzy evidence without realizing that this currently leaves us with no basis for rejecting the solipsistic stance; 4) Like grandpa, don't pursue the question, at least until someone else has figured out more than can be learned from fuzzy observations of human behaviors.

You have suggested that our theory of mind is innate. This is not an unreasonable hypothesis, but I would like to raise two responses to that view, the first suggesting that it is implausible, and the second showing that it would not help your case anyway.

The first is the aforementioned evidence from false belief experiments, which strongly (though not conclusively) suggest that a theory of mind is learned (though ethical considerations limit how far such studies can be taken on human infants.) The existence of an innate fear of snakes would not refute this view.

The second is the question of how we acquire innate phobias. I am not aware of any plausible mechanism other than by natural selection, which is a multi-generational process of learning from what would be, at least in the case of a theory of mind, a fuzzy indirect set of second-order observables. Natural selection is, of course, a process that is explicitly modeled in our most successful machine-learning strategies.